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Lindgren: Trump's Angry White Women: Motherhood, Nationalism, and Abortion

TRUMP'S ANGRY WHITE WOMEN:
MOTHERHOOD, NATIONALISM, AND ABORTION
Yvonne Lindgren*
A majority of white women-fifty-two percent-votedfor Donald
Trump in the 2016 presidential election. White working-class women
supported Trump in even greater numbers: Sixty-one percent of white
women without college degrees voted for Trump. This result seems
remarkable considering Trump's derogatory statements about women
and his staunch opposition to legal access to abortion. Why did white
women, especially those most likely to need access to reproductive
healthcare-poorand working-class women-vote heavily against their
own interests to embrace a candidate who calledforpunishing women
who access abortion? Much recent commentary has considered this
question and drawn various conclusions, including that white women lack
information and live with close ties to conservative white men who they
look to when casting their vote. This Article brings a new perspective to
this question by examining the ways that motherhood is mobilized in
movements for nationalism. Specifically, it shows that Donald Trump's
presidential campaign drew upon a familiar narrative forged by the
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law, 20172020; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri, Kansas City beginning Fall 2020. J.S.D,
LL.M., U.C. Berkeley School of Law; J.D., Hastings College of Law; B.A., U.C.L.A. I would like to
thank Khiara Bridges and Ariela Gross and the participants in the Equality Law Scholars Forum at
U.C. Berkeley School of Law for invaluable feedback on an early draft of this Article. Thank you to
Tristin Green, Kristin Luker, Jamie Abrams, Meghan Boone, Julie Goldscheid, Jessica Knouse, Robin
Lenhardt, Maya Manian, Rachel Rebouch6 and the Family Law Scholars and Teachers Conference at
Cardozo School of Law. I am grateful to the participants in the National Women's Conference: Taking
1977 Into the 21st Century conference at the University of Houston; Robin West and the National
Constitutional Law Scholars Conference at the University of Arizona College of Law; the American
Constitution Society Third Annual Constitutional Law Scholars Forum at Barry University School of
Law; the faculty workshop participants and Golden Gate Law School; the faculty at University of
Missouri, Kansas City; and my colleagues at University of San Francisco School of Law faculty
scholarship series for their comments and feedback. Thank you to Mary Kelly Persyn and to law
student researcher Martin Harris and USF Law librarian Walt Cook for editing and research
assistance.
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family-values movement of the mid-1970s that linked opposition to
abortion with protection of motherhood, family, and nation. Staunch
resistance to abortion rights in this narrativebecame about protectionof
mothers andprotectionofmotherhood ratherthan right-to-life alone. This
message-a message that conflates opposing abortion with protecting
motherhood and American culture and values-continues to animate
opposition to abortion today. Drawing upon social science research and
historicalrecord, this Article seeks to uncover how opposition to abortion
was transformedinto apowerfulexpression ofwhite women's disaffection
and nationalism.
I.

INTRODUCTION

A majority of white women-fifty-two percent-voted for Donald
Trump in the 2016 presidential election.' White working-class women
supported Trump in even greater numbers: Sixty-one percent of white
women without college degrees voted for Trump.2 This result seems
remarkable in light of Trump's derogatory statements about women3 and
1. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Katie Rogers, At Trump Rallies, Women See a Hero Protectinga
Way ofLife, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/1/03/us/politics/trumpwomen.html (noting that Trump continues to boast "when the election was over, they said: 'You
know what? He did great with women."'); see Ronald Brownstein, The WomenWho Gave Trump
the White House Could Tip the Midterms to Democrats, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Aug. 16, 2018),

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/trump-democrats-midterms/567658
(noting
that the white women's vote was crucial to Trump's victory in 2016, particularly in pivotal swing
states such as Iowa, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin); Alec Tyson & Shiva Maniam,
Behind Trump's Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender, Education, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 9, 2016),

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race-gendereducation.
2.

Eugene Scott, White Women Helped Elect Trump. Now He's Losing Their Support, WASH.

PoST (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/01/22/white-womenhelped-elect-trump-now-hes-losing-their-support/?noredirect-on; see Tyson & Maniam, supra note
1. While the working class is a racially diverse group, the white working class has been credited with
sweeping Donald Trump into office and forms the backbone ofthe religious right and the conservative
Tea Party movement. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, WHITE WORKING CLASS: OVERCOMING CLASS
CLUELESSNESS IN AMERICA 74-75 (2017) (noting that Trump won the votes of white working-class
women by a margin of twenty-eight percentage points); see also Nate Silver, Education, Not Income,
Predicted Who
Would
Vote
for
Trump,
FIvETHIRTYEIGHT
(Nov.
22,
2016),

http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/education-no-income-predicted-who-would-vote-for-trump.
3. Michael Barbaro & Megan Twohey, ForEx-Miss Universe, aNew, Harsh Spotlight, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016),https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/us/politics/alicia-machado-donaldtrump.html (describing how Trump described Miss Universe Alicia Machado as "Miss Piggy"); Gail
Collins, Opinion, I've Overestimated Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/opinion/ive-overestimated-donald-trump.html
(describing
how Trump referred to her, a New York Times columnist, as "a dog ...
with the face of a pig.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); David A. Fahrenthold, Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd
Conversation

About

Women

in

2005,

WASH.

POST

(Oct.

8,

2016),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-recorded-having-extremely-lewd-conversation-
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his staunch opposition to legal access to abortion.' Why did white women,
especially those most likely to need access to reproductive healthcarepoor and working-class women-vote heavily against their own interests
to embrace a candidate who called for punishing women who access
abortion? Much recent commentary has asked this question and drawn
various conclusions,' including that white women prefer to identify with
and vote with their racial privilege rather than their gender oppression,6
that white women often conform to the ideologies of the men around them
as a survival strategy,' or simply that white women lack information and
about-women-in-2005/2016/10/07/3b9ce776-8cb4-1e6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html (describing
a 2005 conversation with Billy Bush on Access Hollywood that was caught on tape, in which Trump
is heard bragging: "I just start kissing them.... I don't even wait. And when you're a star, they let
you do it....You can do anything. Grab them by the p[uss]y."). When pressed by Fox News
journalist Megyn Kelly about terms he had used to refer to women such as "fat pigs" and "dogs, slobs,
and disgusting animals," Trump described her questioning him by describing that she had "blood
coming out of her eyes, blood coming out of her wherever." MARJORIE J. SPRUILL, DIVIDED WE
STAND: THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND FAMILY VALUES THAT POLARIZED AMERICAN

POLITICS 336 (2017).
4. During his campaign, he called for "punishing" women who have the abortion procedure.
Matt Flegenheimer & Maggie Haberman, Trump's Call on Abortions Rattles G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES
Mar. 31, 2016, at Al, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/31/us/politics/donald-trump-abortion.html.
His vice-presidential running mate, Mike Pence, promised during a town hall gathering that "Roe vs.
Wade [sic] [will be] consigned to the ash heap of history where it belongs." Seema Mehta, Roe. vs.
Wade Will be Overturned ifDonald Trump Wins, Mike Pence Says, L.A. TIMES (July 28, 2016),
https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2016/jul/28/roe-v-wade-will-be-overtumed-if-trump-wins-pen
ce-.

5. Much recent commentary has considered this question. See, e.g., Clare Malone, Clinton
FIvETHIRTYEIGHT
Women,
White
Over
Win
Couldn't
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/clinton-couldnt-win-over-white-women

(Nov.
(noting

2016),
9,
that class or

education-level was a greater indicator of those who voted for Trump than gender); see Mark Setzler
& Alixander Yanus, Why Did White Women Votefor Donald Trump?, 51 PS: POL. SC. & POL. 523,
525-26 (2018) (noting that sexism and racial resentment had a significant influence on voters ofboth
genders); Nicholas J.G. Winter, Ambivalent Sexism and Election 2016 5, 7-9 (July 22, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), http://faculty.virginia.edu/nwinter/papers/WinterAPSA2018Ambiv
alentSexismAndElection2016.pdf (arguing that "ambivalent sexism" led white women to prefer

Trump over Clinton); Michelle Ruiz, Why Do White Women Keep Votingfor the GOP and Against
Their Own Interests?, VOGUE (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.vogue.com/article/white-women-votersconservative-trump-gop-problem; see also Mark Setzler & Alixander Yanus, Women Voted for
Donald Trumpfor the Same Reasons Men Did - Racism and Sexism, LONDON SCH. OF ECON.: U.S.

CENTRE (Aug. 3, 2018), https://blogs.1se.ac.uk/usappblog/2018/08/03/women-voted-for-donaldtrump-for-the-same-reasons-men-did-racism-and-sexism (noting that beliefs linked to racism and
sexism were the key determinants for whether or not voters supported Trump, regardless of their

gender).
6. Moira Donegan, Opinion, Half of White Women Continue to Vote Republican. What's
Wrong with Them?, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2018/nov/09/white-women-vote-republican-why (noting that white women are at the intersections of

two vectors of privilege and oppression and may choose to vote for Trump because it is a means of
denying the realities ofhow sexist oppression makes them vulnerable).
7. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 14-15 (Coward-McCann 1983) (1978)
(arguing that right-wing white women strike a bargain to support white male power as a subconscious
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live with close ties to conservative white men who they look to when
casting their vote.' To consider this question, this Article examines the
ways that nationalist movements call upon white mothers to protect and
preserve national identity from threats of cultural eclipse by outsiders,
chiefly immigrants. Specifically, it shows that Donald Trump's
presidential campaign drew upon white women's fears of cultural eclipse
and displacement by employing a familiar narrative forged by the familyvalues movement in the mid-I970s that linked opposition to abortion with
protection of white motherhood, family, and nation.
This Article unearths a critical, historical moment of narrative: when
the right-to-life movement of the mid-1970s shifted its anti-abortion
messaging to explicitly link opposition to abortion with the protection of
motherhood, the patriarchal family, and the protection of American
culture and values. What had begun as a movement to protect fetal life
was transformed into a larger call for a return to traditional family
structures and traditional American values. This new anti-abortion
framing drew fresh recruits who transformed the face of the anti-abortion
movement from a movement of white male professionals to a movement
primarily comprised of white women, especially white working-class
women. The narrative that conflates opposition to abortion with protection
of motherhood and America itself continues to animate opposition to
abortion today: Trump's anti-immigrant, anti-establishment, pro-life
message fell in lock-step with the pro-family, pro-life, anti-communist,
and anti-immigrant message developed in the mid-1970s and deployed
full-force by Ronald Reagan and his campaign in the 1980s.' Drawing
upon social science research and the historical record, this Article seeks
to uncover the origins of how opposition to abortion was transformed into
a powerful expression of white women's disaffection and nationalism.
The analysis reaches beyond the adjudicated Constitution to consider how
economic decline, social movements, and a narrative of race, gender,
class, and nationalism are engaged in the struggle over reproductive
rights. In so doing, this Article seeks to reveal the ways in which legal
rights are shaped not solely by courts and legislatures, but by popular
understandings and political rhetoric.

survival strategy to spare them male violence and contempt).
8. Ruiz, supra note 5; Jamal Simmons, Opinion, Understanding 'The White Women Thing,'
THE HILL (Oct. 5, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/409796-understanding-the-whitewomen-thing (describing that white women feel isolated in their progressive ideas and often look to
their husbands, brothers, and sons when voting).
9.

See PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, A CHOICE NOT AN ECHO 265-66 (updated and expanded 50th

anniversary ed., Regnery Publishing 2014) (1964).
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This Article proceeds in three parts: Part II examines opposition to
abortion prior to the 1970s, which focused on the protection of fetal life."
Next, this section explores how motherhood and the patriarchal family
have historically been mobilized in movements for nationalism." At
various points in history, nationalist movements have called upon a
nation's mothers to protect the nation's culture and values because
motherhood and the family are identified as the place where a nation's
values and culture are inculcated in its citizenry. Part III examines a
critical shift in opposition to abortion that transformed from a movement
to protect fetal life to a larger call to protect motherhood, traditional
family, and American values. 1 2 This Part examines how under this new
narrative, abortion is identified as devaluing motherhood and harming
women. 1 3Part IV examines how this narrative was engaged by the Trump
campaign. 4 This Part investigates how Trump intertwined defense of
motherhood, family, and nation by drawing explicit parallels between
women's interest in protecting their families and neighborhoods and the
nation's interest in protecting its borders." In this narrative, defending
motherhood and the traditional American family is integrally related to
protecting American values and culture. Specifically, Trump's antiimmigrant, pro-American narrative of "Make America Great Again,"
played upon the same set of white working- and middle-class American's
fears of being culturally eclipsed by outsiders, relief from economic
decline, and drew upon white backlash against perceived cultural threats.
This Part argues that integral to this messaging is the defense of
motherhood and traditional family that is perceived to be under assault
from the policies of the political left, abortion access chief among them.
In short, if "Build the Wall" is the rallying cry for protecting the nation's
borders, opposition to abortion is its gendered corollary to defend its
mothers, families, and heritage.
II.

SEPARATE STORIES: THE RIGHT-TO-LIFE MOVEMENT AND
MOBILIZING MOTHERHOOD IN DEFENSE OF NATION

To be sure, there had been consistent resistance to abortion rights
even before the Roe v. Wade decision in 1973.16 However, both the

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Part H.A.
See infra Part H.B.
See infra Part HI.
See infra Part 1H.C.
See infta PartlV.
See infra notes 218-222 and accompanying text.
For an excellent discussion of the rise of the right-to-life movement, see generally DAVID
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messaging and the make-up of the resistance were very different than in
the period after Roe. As this Part will describe, opposition to abortion was
primarily focused on protecting fetal life. What is more, the anti-abortion
movement in the period before Roe was comprised primarily of white,
male, Catholic professionals." Other than for Catholics, there was no
alignment between religiosity or political party and opposition to abortion.
Part III will later describe how the family values movement transformed
the face of opposition to abortion by drawing it under a larger political
umbrella that aligned protection of the patriarchal family, American
values, and motherhood with opposition to abortion."
A.

ProtectingFetalLife: The Anti-Abortion Movement
Before Roe v. Wade

The focus of the anti-abortion movement before and in the years
immediately after Roe v. Wade focused on protection of fetal life. Indeed,
early opponents to movements by states to reform abortion laws, such as
those taking place in California with the passage of the Beilenson Bill in
1967,1 were primarily white, male, professional, and Catholic.2 0 The
primary motivation of these early anti-abortion activists was driven by
their belief that life began at conception and abortion was akin to murder
of an innocent life.2 1 As a result, the focus of anti-abortion activism was
the legal protection of embryonic life.2 2 As Mary Ziegler has described,
movement members in the early years before and after Roe stressed the
humanity of the fetus and argued that the fetus enjoyed the same
constitutional rights as anyone else, including a fundamental right to life.2 3
Indeed, in the Roe and Doe v. Bolton cases there were twenty briefs from
a diverse group of disinterested organizations representing women's
issues and physicians' organizations in support of the pro-abortion

J. GARROw, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROEV. WADE

(1994).
17.
18.

KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 145-47 (1984).
See infra Part II.

19. The Beilenson Bill, also known as the Therapeutic Abortion Act, was an abortion reform
bill introduced in the California legislature by Anthony Beilenson. See LUKER, supra note 17, at 6691. On the eve of the Roe decision, sixteen states had already liberalized and reformed their abortion
laws. See id. at 126-27.
20. KARISSA HAUGEBERG, WOMEN AGAINST ABORTION: INSIDE THE LARGEST MORAL
REFORM MOVEMENT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 2 (2017) (noting that in the years before Roe the
Catholic Church was the only established religion explicitly opposed to abortion); see LUKER, supra
note 17, at 126-30.

21. See LUKER, supra note 17, at 126.
22. Id at 130.
23.

MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 37 (2015).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss1/3
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position. 2 4By contrast, the anti-abortion position was supported by only
four amicus briefs that represented single-issue organizations that were
involved exclusively with the abortion issue. 25 In short, these stand-alone
organizations such as Americans United for Life and LIFE (the League
for Infants, Fetuses, and the Elderly), were focused on protecting fetal life
and had not yet connected their movement to a larger narrative of the
family values movement and the New Right that embedded their message
within a larger narrative of protecting family values. 26 As Professor
Kristin Luker noted, while the Roe and Doe cases only garnered the
support of stand-alone, single-issue organizations that were still largely
made up of elite Catholic professionals, the case would mobilize a new
and stronger opposition to abortion. 2 7 As I argue below, opposition to
abortion transformed from the protection of fetal life to a powerful
lightning rod in a struggle over the value of family, motherhood, and
national culture.28
The early response to the Roe decision came from the pro-life camp
of organizations that were made up predominantly of Catholics such as
Americans Against Abortion and focused on the sacredness of fetal life.2 9
As scholars have noted, Evangelical Christians were not yet a major part
of the movement and many in fact supported abortion access.3 0 The antiabortion movement's emphasis on protecting fetal life drove efforts to
establish a fetal protective amendment to the Constitution.3 1 Less than
eight days after the Roe decision, a pro-life Catholic member of the House
of Representatives introduced the first constitutional amendment

24. See LUKER, supra note 17, at 142; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
25. Id. at 142-43 (noting that the four amicus briefs were submitted by "single issue"
organizations as opposed to the wide-ranging organizations in support of abortion rights including
women's organizations and physician organizations).
26. See LUKER, supra note 17, at 143; ZIEGLER, supra note 23, at 30-33 (describing the
"vibrant, fragmented, and flexible" group of diverse anti-abortion organizations that were

championing fetal life in the years before and immediately after the Roe decision).
27.

LUKER, supra note 17, at 143-46.

28. As Professor Kristin Luker describes, the "new activists" in the period after Roe were
predominantly women who were homemakers and had little experience in political activism. In short,
the case mobilized people who had the personal experience of pregnancy, saw motherhood as central
to their lives, and viewed the Supreme Court's decision as devaluing an important aspect of their
sense ofpersonal self-worth. Id. at 145.
29.

See Linda Chariton, Forces Against Abortion Assemble, with Optimism, N.Y. TIMES, June

2, 1974, at Cl3, https://www.nytimes.com/1974/06/02/archives/force-against-abortion-assemblewith-optism-ideas-trends-the.html.
30. See, e.g., R MARIE GRIFFITH, MORAL COMBAT: How SEx DIvIDED AMERICAN
CHRISTIANS & FRACTURED AMERIcAN POLITICS 202 (2017).
31. See ZIEGLER, supranote 23, at 38-44 (describing the efforts at establishing a fetal protective
amendment).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

8

[Vol. 48:1

declaring a fetus a "person" from the moment of conception.3 2 In his
testimony before the Senate subcommittee considering a constitutional
amendment to ban abortion, Cardinal Manning argued "[t]he stark fact is
that the unborn are being destroyed in our country at an unprecedented
rate." 3 3 The National Conference of Catholic Bishops approved a plan for
pro-life activities and its focus was the legal protection of fetal life.3 4 The
Hyde Amendment was introduced in 1976 by Henry Hyde, a Catholic
senator from Illinois, who argued that American taxpayers should not be
forced to pay for "the killing of innocent preborn human life."3 5 As will
be described below, there was an important shift in 1979 when the leaders
of the Christian right began organizing themselves into a social movement
that included opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA") and
abortion as a referendum on family, motherhood, and American values. 3 6
However, at this earlier point, the sole focus of the pro-life movement was
the protection of fetal life.3 7
What is more, the make-up of the resistance to abortion in the years
before Roe was different than in the years after. In the 1970s there was no
difference between Republican and Democratic support for abortion.3 8
Indeed, in a poll taken before the Roe decision, Republicans were more
likely than Democrats to support abortion rights-sixty-eight percent
compared to fifty-nine percent." Until 1979, the parties were about evenly

32.

GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 226.

33.

Id.

34.

ZIEGLER, supra note 23, at 87.

35. GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 227. Indeed, there was widespread use of fetal imagery during
this period by abortion opponents such as images of fetuses held aloft by anti-abortion protesters, the
visual impact of the images of fetuses in the anti-abortion film The Silent Scream in 1985. See
Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Foetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of
Reproduction, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 57, 58
(Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987); Carol Sanger, Seeing andBelieving: Mandatory Ultrasoundandthe

Path to a ProtectedChoice, 56 UCLA L. RE. 351, 356, 377 (2008) (describing that the fetus has
become the "poster child" of the pro-life movement that uses images of the fetus to galvanize antiabortion sentiment, including forced ultrasounds for women who have decided to end their
pregnancies).
36.

See infra Part m.

37.

For an excellent discussion on the right-to-life movement on fetal personhood, see
&

ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY,
330-45 (rev. ed. 1990), discussing the central focus on fetal protection and
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM

noting that by the end of the 1970s, some in the opposition movement began to promote the view that
women who get abortions were themselves victims in need of protection.
38. Neal Devins, Rethinking Judicial Minimalism: Abortion Politics, Party Polarization, and
the Consequences ofReturning the Constitutionto Elected Government, 69 VAND. L. REv. 935, 946

(2016).
39.

See GRIFFITH, supranote 30, at 201.
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split over abortion and abortion was not viewed as a particularly
partisan issue.4 0
In contrast to the period after Roe, in the years leading up to the case
religious organizations were divided on abortion.4 1 Opposition to abortion
in the lead-up to and in the wake of the Roe decision came primarily from
Catholics and conservative Protestants. 42 Evangelical Christians,
including the Southern Baptist Convention, were in support of legalization
of abortion. 4 3Indeed, the Southern Baptist Convention passed a resolution
in the years before Roe calling on members to work for abortion's
legalization and leaders praised the Roe decision." During this period,
many religious leaders made pro-choice arguments on explicitly religious
and moral grounds. 4 5 In the 1960s, mainline Protestant and Jewish
religious organizations4 6supported reform or repeal of criminal abortion
laws and opposition to abortion came almost exclusively from the
Catholic Church.47

40. Id. (describing a 1972 Gallup Poll report that there was strong support in both political
parties for expanding safe and legal access to abortion); Greg D. Adams, Abortion: Evidence oflssue
Evolution, 41 AM. J. POL. SC. 718, 723 (1997).
41. George Gallup, Abortion Seen Up to Woman, Doctor, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1972,
reprinted in BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE

SUPREME COURT'S RULING 207, 208 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel eds., 2010) [hereinafter
BEFOREROE V. WADE] (describing a poll conducted shortly before the Roe decision in response to the
statement that the decision to have an abortion should be made by a woman and her physician); see
GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 201-03.
42. See GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 201; LUKER, supra note 17, at 58-59 (noting that in the

period before Roe, abortion and contraception were a special moral issue solely for Catholics);
Devins, supra note 38, at 950; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Law's Labors, NEW REPUBLIC, May 1994, at
42, 42 (reviewing GARROW, supra note 16).

43. GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 202 (noting that Evangelical Christians and Southern Baptists
supported the legalization of abortion).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 203, 216-22, 238-39 (describing several religious organizations that worked tirelessly
for legalization of abortion, most notably the Catholics for Free Choice and the Clergy Consultation
Service that assisted women with procuring safe abortions in the years before Roe by referring them
to abortion providers before abortion's legalization); ROBERT WUTHNOW, RED STATE RELIGION:
FAITH AND POLITICS IN AMERICA'S HEARTLAND 273 (2012) (noting that between 1966 and 1972

most of the denominations affiliated with the National Council of Churches adopted statements in
support of abortion).
46. See, e.g., Statement from The Reform Jewish Leadership, Union for Reform Judaism, 49th
General Assembly, Montreal, Quebec (Nov. 1967) in BEFOREROE V. WADE, supra note 41, at 69, 70

("We urge our constituent congregations to join with other forward looking citizens in securing
needed revisions and liberalization ofabortion laws."); United Methodist Church, Statement ofSocial
Principles (1972) in BEFOREROE V. WADE, supra note 41, at 70, 70 ("In continuity with past Christian

teaching, we recognize tragic conflicts of life with life that may justify abortion.").
47. See Brief for American Ethical Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-40, 70-18) (describing that the mainline Protestant New York
Council of Churches endorsed the view that abortion was a medical decision and that other

denominations, including Episcopalians, Universalists, and Christian Scientists, were opposed to laws
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The make-up of the anti-abortion movement in the period before and
immediately after Roe stands in sharp contrast to the dramatic
transformation of the movement in the later years after the decision and
up to the present. Opposition to abortion in these early years was focused
exclusively on protecting fetal life and was essentially a stand-alone issue
that was unmoored from political party and religious affiliation, save for
the teachings of the Catholic Church. As described in Part III, in Roe's
wake, the family values movement transformed opposition to abortion
from the protection of fetal life to the protection of a way of life as the
movement brought opposition to abortion under a larger political umbrella
to protect American mothers, families, and the nation.
B.

Motherhood, Nationalism, and Opposition to Abortion

Nationalist movements have historically linked protection of nation
and national culture with the protection and glorification ofmotherhood.4 8
For example, in 1933 in Nazi Germany, Paula Siber, the acting head of
the Association of German Women, articulated the role and duty of white
mothers in the Nazi regime: "To be a woman means to be a mother. . . .the
highest calling of the National Socialist woman is notjust to bear children,
but consciously and out of total devotion to her role and duty as mother to
criminalizing abortion.); HAUGEBERG, supra note 20, at 2 (noting that in the years before Roe the
Catholic Church was the only established religion explicitly opposed to abortion).
48. See, e.g., CLAUDIA KoONZ, MOTHERS IN THE FATHERLAND: WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND
NAZI POLITICS 55-56, 177-79 (1987) (examining how the Nazis appealed to women of the Third
Reich to implement the Nazi goal of white supremacy by raising racially pure, fit children, awarding
incentives to women for bearing children for the glory of the state, and criminalizing abortion); see
also ALEXANDRA HALKIAS, THE EMPTY CRADLE OF DEMOCRACY: SEX, ABORTION, AND
NATIONALISM IN MODERN GREECE 4-5 (2004) (tracing the connection between nationalism and
opposition to abortion in Greece); JASON STANLEY, How FASCISM WORKS: THE POLITICS OF US AND
THEM9-10 (2018) (describing the rise of the Hutu power movement in Rwanda in 1994 that was an
ethnic supremacist movement, established the Hutu Ten Commandments that declared anyone a
traitor who married a Tutsi woman, thereby polluting the pure Hutu bloodline, and identifying women
as wives and mothers who are entrusted with the sacred responsibility of ensuring Hutu ethnic purity);
Wendy Bracewell, Women, Motherhood, and Contemporary Serbian Nationalism, 19 WOMEN'S
STUD. INT'L F. 25, 25 (1996); Alan Finlayson, Ideology, Discourse and Nationalism, 3 J. POL.
IDEOLOGIES 99, 108-09 (1998) (noting that both in Slovenia and Croatia, opposition to abortion is
linked to nationalism); Erica Millar, 'Too Many': Anxious White Nationalism and the Biopoliticsof
Abortion, 30 ASTL. FEMINIST STUD. 82, 85 (2015); Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovic, War, Nationalism,
and Mothers in the Former Yugoslavia, 8 PEACE REV. 3 (1996), reprintedin THE WOMEN AND WAR
READER 234,235 (Lois Ann Lorentzen & Jennifer Turpin eds., 1998). Similarly, in 2010 Hungarians
elected nationalist Viktor Orbin who oversaw the creation of the "illiberal state" that was founded on
"the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood" and "promoting and safeguarding our heritage."
STANLEY, supra, at 11-12. The new Hungarian constitution sets forth "fundamental laws" that include
the preservation of the institution of marriage as between a man and a woman, encouraging the
commitment of married couples to have children, protecting and safeguarding the family, and
prohibiting abortion. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss1/3

10

Lindgren: Trump's Angry White Women: Motherhood, Nationalism, and Abortion

2019]

11

TRUMP'SANGRY WHITE WOMEN

raise children for her people." 4 9 Under this narrative, women are called
upon to protect and build nationhood through their childbearing role and
to inculcate national identity by imparting the culture and values of the
nation in its citizens. Thus, women's role in nationalism requires both
child-bearing and child-rearing, and restriction on abortion is directly
linked to preservation of the nation.o Motherhood and traditional family
stand as the bulwark that forges national identity and protects a nation
from outsiders.
Indeed, nationalist movements across the globe have called upon the
nation's mothers to build national identity and have outlawed abortion to
force "good" mothers to reproduce as a bulwark against the threat of
immigration diluting national identity. For example, nationalists in Greece
opposed abortion due to their concern with being:
[O]verrun by .. . proliferating Muslims and other "foreigners" who are

more and more immigrating to Greece. The only protection 'we' have
from such a prospect, according to this story, is if Greek women do their
part to protect the nation in these dire straits by ceasing to abort ...

and

51
fulfilling their civic duty to be a mother.

In both Slovenia and Croatia, opposition to abortion has been linked
to nationalism and its view that abortion undermines the preservation of
the nation.52 Similarly, Serbian state socialism and authoritarian
nationalism both approach reproduction and motherhood from a collective
perspective that motherhood is in service to the state and that motherhood
is an integral part of nation building and preservation.5 3 "[W]hen

49. Paula Siber, The New German Woman, in FASCISM 136,137 (Roger Griffin ed., 1995);
see also Gregor Strasser, Motherhood and Warriorhood as the Key to a National Socialism, in
FASCISM, supra, at 123 ("For a man, military service is the most profound and valuable form of
participation in the State-for the woman it is motherhood!").
50. See, e.g., KooNZ, supra note 48, at 7, 55-56,392 (describing how the Nazi goal of white
supremacy incentivized women for bearing children for the glory of the state and criminalized
abortion); see also HALKIAS, supra note 48, at 5 (tracing the connection between nationalism and
opposition to abortion as stemming from Greece's concern with being "overrun by . . proliferating
Muslims and other 'foreigners' who are more and more immigrating to Greece."); STANLEY, supra
note 48, at 10-12 (describing that in 2010 Hungarians elected nationalist Viktor Orbin and a new
constitution prohibited abortion); Finlayson, supra note 48, at 108 (noting that both in Slovenia and
Croatia, opposition to abortion is linked to nationalism that views abortion as undermining the
preservation of the nation); Millar, supra note 48, at 87-88 (noting that fears that Australia has too
many abortions circulates with intensity in times of increased worry over the vulnerability of white
demographic and sociocultural dominance in Australia); Nikolic-Ristanovic, supra note 48, at 235
(noting that when nationalism and militarism escalated in the former Yugoslavia, the glorification of
women started with restrictions on abortion access).
51. HALKIAS, supra note 48, at 5.
52. Finlayson, supra note 48, at 108.
53. Bracewell, supra note 48, at 25.
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nationalism and militarism escalated in the former Yugoslavia, the
glorification of women as biological reproducers of the nation began[]"
and immediately ushered in restrictions on abortion access. 5 4 In her
article, 'Too Many': Anxious White Nationalism and the Biopolitics of
Abortion, Erica Millar discusses that the fear that Australians have too
many abortions rises with the greatest intensity in times of increased
worry among white Australians over the "vulnerability of white
demographic and sociocultural dominance in Australia."" The rise of the
ethnic supremacist Hutu power movement in Rwanda in 1994 established
the Hutu Ten Commandments that declared anyone a traitor who married
a Tutsi woman, thereby polluting the pure Hutu bloodline, and identifying
women as wives and mothers who are entrusted with the sacred
responsibility of ensuring Hutu ethnic purity." Similarly, in 2010
Hungarians elected nationalist Viktor Orbin whose campaign and
leadership was founded on "the role of Christianity in preserving
nationhood" and "promoting and safeguarding our heritage." 5 7 The new
Hungarian constitution sets forth "fundamental laws" that include the
preservation of the institution of marriage as between a man and a woman,
encouraging the commitment of married couples to have children,
protecting and safeguarding the family, and prohibiting abortion.s
Similar connections between motherhood and nationalism have
undergirded the narrative of preserving nationhood in the United States.
For example, white women used a rhetoric of motherhood to mobilize in
the South to maintain segregation in opposition to the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Boardof Education and campaigns against school
busing." Opposition to the Brown decision was framed as an "erosion of
parental, local, and states' rights" and resistance to the decision was
framed as the duty of mothers to defend against challenges to the authority
of the American family and to maintain racial purity.6 0 The rhetoric of
motherhood and protecting family values-and in turn national valuesemployed a racialized motherhood that equated good mothers with white
motherhood. 6 1White women who invoked motherhood as a site of
inculcating national values touted "middle-class motherhood that married

54. Nikolic-Ristanovic, supra note 48, at 235.
55. Millar, supra note 48, at 82, 88.
56. STANLEY, supra note 48, at 9-10.
57. Id. at 11 (quoting from the National Avowal portion of Hungary's constitution).
58. Id. at 11-12.
59. ELIZABETH GILLESPIE MCRAE, MOTHERS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: WHITE WOMAN AND
THE POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY 208-16 (2018).
60. Id. at 168.
61. Id.at168-69.
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gender roles ... to a political platform of family autonomy and parental
rights-a kind of white supremacist maternalism." 6 2
In the post-war period, conservative white women "decried the
erosion of national sovereignty by the United Nations," the expanding role
of the federal government, and the eclipse of state sovereignty by linking
them to the destruction of the authority of the American family and the
6 3
power of mothers to inculcate citizenship and values in their children.
National security arguments in the midst of the Cold War were framed in
the gendered political language of conservative white women as defense
of home, children, and families against the threat of outsiders.'
Opposition to American participation in the United Nations ("U.N.") was
framed by conservative white women activists as a "new international
order," and "[the postwar global order resulted in transposing anxieties
about the world into threats to women's authority over their home,
children, and schools."" Under this rubric, enhanced federal government,
the Democratic Party, and the U.N. all threatened the sanctity and
authority of motherhood and the patriarchal family.6 6 The conservative
right argued that the power of motherhood and the authority of the family
were under assault by internationalism, immigration, multiculturalism,
the U.N., and the "dilution of an 'American' identity."67
Conservative white women who viewed classroom instruction as an
extension of the inculcation of values in the home worked tirelessly to
oppose the creation of the Department of Education, and to ensure a
"curriculum centered on American exceptionalism." 6 8 They viewed
public schools as an extension of their homes and argued that the
education there should "reflect their values exclusively, upholding
parental authority and patriotism."69 Indeed, conservative white women
rallied against the introduction of a U.N. curriculum in schools by arguing
that U.N. materials insulted American mothers and sought to reverse the

62. Id. at 10. A recent commentator observed that Donald Trump has similarly mobilized
motherhood as a tool of white supremacy. See Megan Reynolds, In the Trump Administration,
Motherhood Is a Tool of White Supremacy, JEZEBEL (Aug. 15, 2018, 2:00 PM),
https://theslot.jezebel.com/in-the-trump-administration-motherhood-is-a-tool-of-wh-1827960231(noting that women in the Trump administration, from Kellyanne Conway to Sarah Huckabee

Sanders,
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

wield white motherhood in defense of Trump's policies).
McRAE, supranote 59, at 145-46.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 139-41.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 16.
Id
Id
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teachings of mothers in their homes.7 0 In the face of what conservative
white women saw as an internationalist politicized education, white
women were called upon to lead the fight to defend family and
motherhood as the location of instilling American values in its citizenry.7 1
Conservatives objected to a strong federal role in educating young
children, arguing instead for protecting traditional gender roles and family
structures and leaving education of young children to the domain of
parents, the private sector, and state and local school boards that reflected
local values. 7 2 In short, conservatives viewed motherhood as central to
instilling national values and protecting national identity.
Part HI examines the transformation in the messaging of the pro-life
movement that occurred in the mid-1970s. The Part investigates how the
movement transformed from a focus on fetal life to a broader call to
protect motherhood and American culture and values. Part IV will
examine how the same rhetoric of motherhood and nationalism was
deployed in Donald Trump's presidential campaign to mobilize popular
support for Trump among white women.7 3
III. THE RISE OF A NEW ANTI-ABORTION NARRATIVE: FROM
PROTECTING LIFE TO PROTECTING MOTHERS AND MOTHERHOOD

In 1972, as Congress sent the Equal Rights Amendment to the states
for ratification, anti-ERA activists used the amendment as a lightning rod
to build a "pro-family" consensus by highlighting that at its heart, both
the ERA and abortion represented an abdication and devaluing of
motherhood. 7 4The abortion issue was reframed from protection of fetal
life, as had been the primary focus of anti-abortion literature up to that
point, 7 5 to a question of defending mothers and motherhood. 7 6 This Part
examines two developments that propelled the polemic that abortion
devalues mothers and motherhood. First, this Part addresses the
development of the woman-protective anti-abortion argument based on a
70.
71.

Id. at 149.
See id. at 148-49.

72.

SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 249.

73.
74.

See infra Part IV.
SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 74-75, 81-83.

75. See Dennis J. Horan et al., The Legal Casefor the Unborn Child, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE (Thomas W. Hilgers & Dennis J. Horan eds., 1972), reprintedinBEFOREROEV. WADE, supra

note 41, at 89, 89-90; New Jersey Catholic Bishops' Letter (1970), in BEFORE ROEv. WADE, supra
note 41, at 81, 81-84; see also Robert D. Knapp, Jr., Similarly I Will Not...Cause Abortion, 122 J. LA.
ST. MED. SOc'Y, 297-301 (1970), reprintedin BEFOREROE v. WADE, supra note 41, at 94, 94-97.
76. See Phyllis Schlafly, Women's Libbers DO NOT Speakfor Us, THE PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY
REP. (Eagle Trust Fund, Alton, Ill.), Feb. 1972, reprintedin BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 41, at

218, 218-20.
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narrative that abortion harms women. Second, this Part addresses the
appeal of the pro-family message during a period of economic decline that
began in 1974 and diverging destinies of educated "liberated" women and
traditional, religious, and working-class women. Both of these
developments drew white women to the pro-family ranks with the call to
defend motherhood and a way of life they perceived to be under threat.
A.

Tying Motherhoodand Nationalism to Opposition to Abortion:
The Rise of the New Right and the Family Values Agenda

In 1979, there was a critical shift in opposition to abortion. In that
year, leaders of the emerging Christian right were beginning to mobilize
into a united front to stand against feminism, the ERA, abortion rights,
and other forces they believed threatened the traditional family and
American values. 7 7 In that year, Reverend Jerry Falwell founded the
Moral Majority to oppose the influence of secular humanism, abortion,
feminism, and gay rights.7 Beverly LaHaye founded Concerned Women
for America that year to take action against abortion rights, sex education,
and homosexuality. 7 Similarly, Phyllis Schlafly expanded her STOP
ERA organization into a powerful grassroots "pro-family" movement to
oppose feminism and abortion, which she warned threatened divinely
created gender roles and familial structures." Strategists such as Paul
Weyrich would cofound the Heritage Institute during this period and is
These
widely credited as being the architect of the New Right."
cast
Wallace,
conservative activists, along with politicians such as George
the traditional nuclear family and American values as in crisis and
believed their defense was their patriotic duty.8 2
These organizations helped to forge a social agenda for the
Republican Party that identified homosexuality, abortion rights, and
feminism as a threat to the social order of traditional family and American
values. Constructing a "family-values" agenda to undergird the
Republican Party platform was a new and effective strategy. The
conservative right's family-values agenda completely transformed the
face of the Republican Party. Indeed, 1980 would mark a major turning

77.
78.

GRIFFITH,supra note 30, at 228; see also SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 292-313.
GRIFFITH,supra note 30, at 228.

79.
80.

Id.
STOP ERA was a movement led by Phyllis Schlafly and was an acronym for "stop taking

our privileges." See SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 9-12.

81. For an excellent discussion on Paul Weyrich and the New Right, see ZIEGLER, supra note
23, at 12-17.
82. ROBERT 0. SELF, ALL IN THE FAMILY: THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
SINCE THE 1960s 6 (2012).
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point in the Republican Party. That year, at the Grand Old Party ("GOP")
convention in Detroit, pro-family and New Right forces dominated the
platform committee, which took a strong pro-life position that opposed
federal funding for abortion related-healthcare, called for adding a
"human life amendment" to the Constitution, and supported a plank that
required a pro-life position as a prerequisite of any Supreme Court
nominee." The platform also removed support for the ERA from the party
platform, which the party had supported since at least 1940.84
Despite having previously supported both legalization of abortion
and the ERA, Ronald Reagan harnessed this new social agenda in the
1980s in his successful presidential bid against Jimmy Carter by openly
campaigning in support of the Christian right and courting the right-to-life
movement by campaigning in support of a constitutional amendment
against abortion.s Addressing more than 17,000 members of the ProFamily Movement at an event in Dallas, Texas sponsored by the Religious
Roundtable, candidate Reagan addressed the crowd to proclaim his
promise to save the nation and traditional values:8 6 "You and I are meeting
at a time when traditional Judeo-Christian values, based on moral
teachings of religion, are undergoing what is perhaps their most serious
challenge in our nation's history ... we have come to a time in the United
States when ... our free society is ... threatened." 7 Reagan's nomination
and landslide victory were largely attributed to the "army of conservative
and pro-life women nationwide" who worked tirelessly to deliver
religious and conservative voters.8
The conservative revolution of the mid-1970s aligned conservative
religious organizations with a conservative social agenda, including

83.

SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 287-88.

84. Linda Greenhouse, Who Killed the ERA?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/10/12/womens-rights-who-killed-era (reviewing SPRUILL,
supra note 3). The amendment had previously been supported by prominent conservative Republicans
such as George Wallace, the pro-segregationist Governor of Alabama, and Strom Thurmond, a
Republican senator from South Carolina, who said in 1972 that the ERA "represents the just desire
of many women in our pluralistic society to be allowed a full and free participation in the American
way of life." Id.
85.

GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 228; SELF, supra note 82, at 6; SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 286-

87 (noting that both Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush had earlier supported both the ERA and
legalization ofabortion).
86. SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 311.
87. ROSEMARY THOMSON, WITHSTANDING HUMANISM'S CHALLENGE TO FAMIUES:
ANATOMY OF A WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE 148-49 (1981).
88. Elaine Donnelly, What Women Wanted: ReaganAppealed to and Developed a Generation
of
Female
Conservatives,
NAT'L
REV.
ONLINE
(June
7,
2004),

https://www.nationalreview.com/2004/06/what-women-wanted-elaine-donnelly;
supra note 87, at 148-50.
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opposition to abortion as central to the new agenda. In the wake of Roe v.
Wade, evangelical and conservative leaders "seized on the abortion issue
to mobilize conservative Protestants as voters [and] new alliances
emerged between evangelicals and conservative Catholics, and abortion
became a wedge issue dividing conservative religious Republican voters
from secular feminists and liberal Democrats." 8 9 If in the period
immediately before and after Roe, religious opposition was primarily
Catholic, by the late 1970s the conservative movement in conjunction
with Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign, "had begun to focus on
abortion as an issue around which to build party discipline in Congress."9 0
This realignment of the Republican Party framed opposition to abortion
as a central party plank to protect traditional family roles. 9 Thus, in the
mid-1970s abortion became part of a larger call for a return to traditional
family structures and traditional American values. As a result, by the mid1970s, a narrative had emerged that identified abortion as a threat to
traditional families, Christian values, and motherhood itself. This
narrative removed the right to abortion from its narrow framing of the
right to life and transformed it into a referendum of deeply-held cultural
and social values related to family, motherhood, religion, and tradition.
During this period, the feminist call for abortion rights was understood by
homemakers and religious conservatives as "an indictment of their values
and worldview by people they believed did not fundamentally understand
them." 92More fundamentally, the patriarchal family was cast as central to
the mythic virtuous past which must be protected from liberal ideals and
women's equality.9 3
In the years after the Roe decision, the conventional pro-life
movement, which had been led primarily by professional white men who
focused almost exclusively on the rights of fetuses, began to shift focus to
protection of women's health and emotional well-being as a result of the
influx of women into the movement.9 4 For example, pro-life activist
Marjory Mecklenburg who served as chair of the Catholic National Right

89.

GRiFFITH, supra note 30, at 203.

90. Devins, supra note 38, at 954 (quoting Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and
After) Roe v. Wade:New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALEL.J. 2028, 2061 (2011)); see BEFORE
ROE V. WADE, supra note 41, at 259.
91.

BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 41, at 260.

92. SELF, supra note 82, at 283.
93. The rhetoric of an idealized mythic past and protection of the patriarchal family and
motherhood is an integral aspect of nationalist movements. See, e.g., STANLEY, supra note 48, at 1213.
94. HAUGEBERG, supranote 20, at 9-10 (describing the development of crisis pregnancy centers
as an important shift away from a focus on the rights of fetuses to a concern with the physical and
emotional well-being of pregnant women).
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to Life Committee in 1973 after the Roe decision, left the organization
because of its exclusive focus on the protection of fetal life rather than
pregnant women's needs. 9 5 She founded a new group in 1974, American
Citizens Concerned for Life, which shifted focus to pregnant women and
opened the nation's first crisis pregnancy centers that addressed pregnant
women's physical and emotional wellbeing. 96 Similarly, Dr. Mildred
Jefferson, president of the National Right to Life Committee, sought to
shift the focus of the organization from exclusive focus on the sanctity of
fetal life to arguments that abortion is a form of racial genocide.9 7 In the
years after Roe, the anti-abortion movement expanded beyond the
previous singular focus on protecting fetal life to broader social justice
goals." While there are many examples of women in the anti-abortion
movement who changed messaging from fetal rights to protection of
women and motherhood, the next Part will examine this important shift in
messaging by examining the political activism of one of the chief
architects of the family values movement, Phyllis Schlafly.
B.

ProtectingMothers: Phyllis Schlafly and the Pivot to ProMotherhood Opposition to Abortion

Phyllis Schlafly was a self-described "traditional woman," a wife and
mother of six who, after an unsuccessful run for Congress, established her
political career by opposing the ERA with her effective grassroots
organization STOP ERA. By the end of 1973, the ERA was well on its
way to ratification. 9 9 The amendment had already been ratified by thirty
states and had widespread support, even in traditionally conservative
states such as Texas. 100

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 9-11,16-17.
Id at 5.
Id.
For an excellent discussion on the ERA's path to ratification, see generally JANE J.

MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986).

100. Ratification of the amendment had a deadline of March 22, 1979. Indeed, the ERA was
traditionally supported by the Republican Party, and it was included in every national Republican
convention from 1944 to 1980. DAID FRUM, How WE GOT HERE: THE 70's: THE DECADE THAT
BROUGHT YOU MODERN LIFE (FOR BETER OR WORSE) 245 (2000). The ERA also had the support

of three Republican presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford, and its
support was consistent with the Republican values. Indeed, the Republican National Committee
adopted a rule in 1924 that required that women be equally represented in all Republican National
Convention committees. JANET M. MARTIN, THE PRESIDENCY AND WOMEN: PROMISE
PERFORMANCE & ILLUSION 26 (2003). In 1972, the amendment had support of both Republicans and

Democrats. After the amendment was passed in both the House ofRepresentatives and the Senate, it
was officially endorsed by Republican President Richard Nixon. On the political left, the amendment
was supported by the National Organization for Women; on the right, it was championed by the
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Despite this widespread support,o' in 1972 Schlafly launched her
STOP ERA movement and began a tireless campaign to challenge the
ERA from a conservative values agenda. 102 She was effective. By 1975
the future of the ERA was in doubt, while thirty-four of the necessary
thirty-eight states had ratified the amendment, two had chosen to rescind
their ratification." 0 Many attribute the dramatic change-the ERA
seemed certain to pass in 1972" but was all but dead by 1975-to the
tireless opposition of anti-ERA activists, Schlafly chief among them, who
masterfully created coalitions to defeat the amendment.os
At the launch of the pro-family movement at a convention in
Houston in 1977 organized to oppose the National Women's Conference
taking place across town, Anita Bryant, in the form of a videotaped
message, addressed the crowd of conservative family-values activists and
declared that mothers are "truly the backbone of America" and that "in
Houston and all over the nation the voice of motherhood will be heard!"1 0 6
Schlafly took to the stage and applauded the "God-fearing Americans" at
the rally who came to wrest control of the nation from feminists who
threatened to destroy American families and undermine American
strength. 1 0 7Schlafly argued that devotion to home and family called for
women to protect the nation and government because since the earliest

President of the National Federation of Republican Women, Gladys O'Donnell, and the co-chair of
the Republican National Committee, Mary Crisp. See Elizabeth L. Erwin, Evangelical Equality: The
Feminism of Phyllis Schlafly (Apr. 27, 2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Lehigh University) (on file
with Lehigh Preserve, Lehigh University). Governor George Wallace of Alabama, who had endorsed
segregation, endorsed the ERA in 1968, as did Strom Thurmond, a Republican senator from South
Carolina, stating that the amendment "represents the just desire of many women in our pluralistic
society to be allowed the full and free participation in the American way of life." Greenhouse, supra
note 84.
101. The House approved theERA by avote of 354-24 in 1971, and the Senatebyavote of 848 the following year. Greenhouse, supra note 84.
102. SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 9.
103. Nebraska and Idaho had rescinded ratification of the ERA. Id. at 109.
104. JANET K. BOLES, THE POLITICS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: CONFLICT AND THE
DECISION PROCESS 196-202 (1975) (noting that in 1972 the passage of the ERA was unstoppable,
with the majority of people in the United States supporting the Amendment and the endorsement of a
wide array of women's groups from the League of Women Voters to Girl Scouts of America as well
as religious organizations including the National Council of Churches).
105. CAROL FELSENTHAL, THE SWEETHEART OF THE SILENT MAJORITY: THE BIOGRAPHY OF
PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY 259-61, 264 (1981); SUSAN M. HARTMAN, FROM MARGIN TO MAINSTREAM:
AMERICAN WOMEN AND POLITICS SINCE 1960, at 137-41 (1989); MANSBRIDGE, supra note 99, at

110.
106. SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 11 (citation omitted); see Judy Klemesrud, EqualRights Plan and
Abortion Are Opposed by 15,000 at Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1977, at 32,
https://www.nytimes.com/1977/11/20/archives/equal-rights-plan-and-abortion-are-opposed-by15000-at-rally-like-a.html.
107. SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 12.
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days of the republic women carried responsibility for acting as the
nation's moral compass.os Schlafly harnessed a movement of what she
described as "an army of dedicated women wearing eagles as the symbol
of American freedom" engaged in the fight for "morality in government,
constitutional government, a strong national defense, and free
enterprise." 1 0 9 Inshort, the role of white women in the pro-family
movement was to "keep[] America great by keeping America good."o
Schlafly's opposition to abortion and the ERA rested on a family
values narrative that set forth the family as the basic unit of society and
women's role in the family as the moral guardians responsible for raising
and educating its citizenry. In so doing, she effectively linked motherhood
and family with protecting and promoting national identity. For example,
in launching her organization, the Eagle Forum, Schlafly noted: "Liberty
is a woman, Justice is a woman, Victory is a woman, and Mother is a
woman. Western civilization cannot endure without women of virtue and
courage who provide leadership on the moral issues.""' Indeed, the profamily organization described itself as "a national organization of women
and men who believe in God, Home, and Country, and are determined to
defend the values that have made America the greatest nation in the
world." 1 1 2The message intertwined motherhood, traditional family, and
protecting American values and identity.
Anti-ERA and anti-abortion activists effectively recast the feminist
movement's call for equality and reproductive rights as a threat to the
traditional nuclear family, motherhood, Christian values, and America
itself. The rallying cry of the pro-family movement in its fight against the
ERA and abortion rights can be summed up by the slogan of one group
from Mississippi: "Mississippians for God, Country, and Family." 13
Their slogan reflected the conflation of national, Christian, and family
values. The rallying song of the pro-family movement was "God Bless
America" which they often sang in response to their opponent's rendition
of "We Shall Overcome." 1 14 The pro-family movement was able to
mobilize a national movement made up primarily of white women by
casting the struggle as one to protect motherhood, family, and nation. As

108. Id. at 77.
109. Id. at 79 (citation omitted).
110.

Messagefrom Director Shirley Curry, EAGLE F. NEWSL. (Eagle Forum, Alton, Ill.) Jan.

1976.
111. SPRULL, supra note 3, at 111 (quoting from Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum brochure
through which she solicited membership).
112. Id.
113. Id at 186.
114. Id. at 187.
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historian Marjorie Spruill described, the pro-family movement identified
the ERA, abortion rights, and feminists as "a grave threat to the traditional
family and to the United States as a moral, Christian nation. They urged
their followers . .. to defend their way of life. . .. "'1

Their argument

rested on a narrative that fundamental guiding principles of gender roles,
family, and the homemaker-breadwinner organization of family life were
under assault. 116 i so doing, anti-feminist opposition to women's equality
and abortion rights was elevated beyond the realm of political and moral
beliefs to a struggle over cultural identity and way of life, and national
identity. Indeed, it was during the mid-1970s that conservative women
first identified their anti-feminist, anti-ERA, and anti-abortion movement
as a "pro-family" movement and identified themselves as defenders of
"family values."' 1 7By contrast, feminists were denounced as "un-Godly,"
"un-patriotic," and "anti-family."'
The rhetoric of the newly-emboldened "Religious Right" described
their struggle against abortion and feminism in the language of soldiers in
a holy war to save their nation. As one leader of the conservative women's
movement Rosemary Thomson wrote in her book The Price of LIBerty,
"The front lines have been drawn ... [t]he storm troops of Women's Lib
are entrenched in governmental outposts," and the time had come to fight
the evil forces "engulfing our families, our churches, and our nation."l9
Reverend Jerry Falwell, the leader of the Moral Majority, wrote that the
"great Christian army .. . [would show] the godless minority .. . [that]
they do not represent the majority" and that they would no longer "permit
the destruction of their country by godless, liberal philosophies."'2 0
The narrative of motherhood and nationalism identifies motherhood
as sacrosanct and its protection as central to protecting a nation's culture
and values. This argument was used by conservative women in the profamily movement in opposition to federal daycare centers. Attacks on
access to abortion sought to associate it with child care centers, which

115. Id. at 137-38.
116. See SELF, supra note 82, at 297.
117. SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 216. Bella Abzug, the Presiding Officer of the International
Women's Year Houston Women's Convention, challenged their terminology, arguing "[n]o one has
a monopoly on the family." Id.
118. See id. at 216 (pushing back, Betty Friedan declared that feminists would not "let Phyllis
Schlafly take over family, love, and God"). See generally Lindsy Van Gelder, Four Days that
Changed the World: Behind the Scenes in Houston, MS., Mar. 1978 (recounting the 1977 National

Women's Conference in Houston, Texas, including criticism attendees faced from conservative
women's groups).
119. ROSEMARYTHOMSON, THE PRICEOF LBERTY 153-54 (1978); see SPRUILL, supra note 3,

at 293 (discussing Thomson's "fiery rhetoric loaded with military and religious metaphors").
120.

SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 309 (citation omitted).
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were a central claim of feminists. In 1972, for example, Schlafly wrote,
"Women's lib is a total assault on the role of the American woman as wife
and mother and on the family as the basic unit of society.... They are

promoting Federal 'day-care centers' for babies instead of homes. They
are promoting abortions instead of families."12 1 In 1971, conservative
opposition to the Comprehensive Child Development Act, which would
have provided near-universal childcare to U.S. families, argued that the
law would destroy the basic family unit, insulted motherhood, and would
lead to the "death of God." 22
In the mid-1970s, conservatives argued that opposition to abortion,
ERA,
and feminism was necessary to defend against outsiders such as
the
communists who threatened American sovereignty, culture, and values.
Through her newsletter, The Phyllis Schlafly Report, Schlafly argued
against the ERA, feminism, and abortion rights using a powerful narrative
of religious, patriotic, nationalist, and anti-communist fervor. 123 The
movement to end the ERA was cast as protecting American motherhood
and traditional family and had close ties to far-right pro-American anticommunist nationalist organizations like the John Birch Soiety. 124 The
ERA and abortion were identified as undermining America by
undermining its moral power through the promotion of "secular
humanism" and "moral relativism," thereby paving the way for the
influence of communism.' 2 5 Indeed, the movement to stop the ERA and
abortion highlighted the privileged role of American women by
contrasting it with the life of women in the Soviet Union. 126 The profamily Eagle Forum, launched in 1975, was organized to oppose "antifamily, anti-religious, anti-morality, anti-children, anti-life, and anti[national] self-defense." 12 7As one commentator at the time noted, the
fight over women's rights and abortion rights was becoming a
sterile battleground between those who want to see inequities redressed
and those who want to turn the clock back to a world that never
was.... The kind of people who encouraged the McCarthyite smears of

121. Schlafly, supra note 76, at219.
122. SELF, supra note 82, at 276.
123. SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 80 (describing the Phyllis Schlafly Report as a "polemic" against
feminism and the ERA that combined "religious and patriotic fervor, her nationalist and anticommunist convictions, and her admiration for the free-enterprise system").
124. Id at 84.
125. See id. at 105; see also THOMSON, supra note 119, at 29, 42, 111.
126.

SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 80.

127. Id. at 111 (quoting Brochure from Phyllis Schlafly, President of the Eagle Forum & Shirley
Curry, Vice President of the Eagle Forum, to subscribers (Aug. 1975) (on file with the Schlesinger
Library at Harvard University)).
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the 1950s and defended segregation in the 1960s are now permeating
the ranks of those who fear guaranteed equal rights for women.1 28
In short, during this period, white motherhood was mobilized in defense
of family and in opposition to abortion that was integrally related to
defense of nation from the threat of communism. 12 9
The pro-family movement also sought to connect defense of national
culture and sovereignty with opposition to feminism and abortion rights
by highlighting that the National Women's Convention and the
International Women's Year ("IWY")130were inspired by the U.N., an
institution that many conservatives viewed as a threat to national
security. 1' Opponents of the ERA and abortion rights argued that the
ERA, abortion, and federally-funded childcare all sprang from the UN's
IWY agenda. The groups opposed the IWY National Women's
Conference in Houston in 1977 and the World Plan of Action that had
been adopted in the U.N.'s IWY Conference in Mexico City in 1975,
which they believed promoted "one-world government" and threatened
American sovereignty. 1 3 2 Indeed, the John Birch Society publication,
American Opinion, described the IWY National Women's Conference in
Houston as "an unprecedented example of how those supporting the New
World Order operate" and describing the conference as populated with
"old-line Stalinoids" and other "active enemies of the United States."13 3
Conservative rhetoric had forged links between feminism, abortion rights,
the ERA, and threats to national sovereignty and security.
C.

ProtectingMotherhoodand Opposing Abortion

By the late 1970s, the pro-family movement had become a largescale social movement, primarily run by white women, that reached

128.

Opinion, Extremists Are Taking over Women's Strugglefor Equality, COURIER J., July 21,

1977, at A10, https://www.newspapers.com/image/110265587.
129. J. Edgar Hoover, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, echoed the role of
white women in protecting the nation against communism, "Communists ...

under the guise of

academic freedom can teach our youth a way of life that eventually will destroy the sanctity of the
home." McRAE, supra note 59, at 143.
130. "[T]he United Nations declared 1975 to be International Women's Year and President
Gerald Ford established a national IWY Commission to draw up recommendations to promote
equality between men and women." SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 205 (internal quotation omitted). The

IWY would culminate in a National Women's Convention in Houston, Texas in 1977. In the lead-up
to the national convention, every state held conventions to vote on resolutions to take to the Houston
convention. See id. at 178-86, 205.
131. Id. at 138.
132. Id. at 136-39.
133. Id. at 232 (quoting Susan L. Huck, Five Million DollarMisunderstanding, AM. OPINION 14 (Jan. 1978)).
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beyond protection of fetal life to protection of a way of life.13 4 Central to
this new narrative was the critical role of white mothers in defending the
nation's culture and values to preserve an American way of life. Critically,
the anti-abortion movement shifted tack from protecting fetal life to
protecting mothers, motherhood, and family values.
1. Opposition to Abortion and Protection of Mothers: WomanProtective Anti-Abortion Regulations
In the mid-1970s, the right-to-life movement developed a new
strategy to attack legal access to abortion based on the argument that
abortion harms women. 1 3 5 Describing the harm as "abortion syndrome,"
the anti-abortion literature claimed scientific research revealed that
abortion was more harmful to women's health than childbirth.'36 This new
argument aligned with the larger narrative that sought to glorify
motherhood and the traditional family and cast abortion as an abdication
that devalued motherhood and mothers. 13 7 Anti-abortion activists
gathered stories and narratives of women who claimed that they were
harmed by abortion, including "suicide attempts, sexual promiscuity,
eating disorders, and drug and alcohol abuse."'3 8 As one tract, entitled You
Are Hurting, described, when a woman becomes pregnant, "the body
machinery gears up to produce a child: The Maternal mind set begins to
establish. Any thwarting of this natural process (such as an abortion)
upsets the body ecology and scars the psyche of the would-be mother."1 39
The woman-protective argument transforms the dialogue around abortion
away from protecting the life of the fetus to protecting women from the
regret and depression, as well as alleged physical harm that can result
from abortion.140

134. See GARROW, supra note 16, at 633 (noting that the right-to-life movement during this
period transitioned to a movement made up primarily of "married women of modest educational
backgrounds who had children and were not employed outside of the home"); SPRUILL, supranote 3,
at 192-93; Dick Behn, Commentary, Antifeminism:New Conservative Force, RIPON F., Sept. 1, 1977

(describing that a "serious . . . conservative movement emerged at state conferences for the
International Women's Year" which could become a "powerful force" ifjoined with the anti-gay,
anti-gun control, anti-abortion, and anti-busing movements). Rather than a primary concern for
fetuses, this new anti-abortion movement was interested in traditional concepts of morality and a

glorification ofmotherhood. See supranotes 89-133 and infra notes 135-177 and accompanying text.
135.

See generally HAUGEBERG,

supra note 20, at 35-55 (describing the "invention of

postabortion syndrome").
136. See id. at 38.
137.
138.

See supra and infra Part If.
HAUGEBERG, supra note 20, at 40.

139.

Id. at 40-41.

140. Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics ofAbortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective
Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991,993; see Eileen Fegan, Reclaiming Women's Agency:
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Drawing upon "scientific" research and the testimonials of women
who have undergone the procedure and later claim to regret their
abortions, abortion opponents sought to restrict abortion access by
increasing targeted restrictions on abortion providers (TRAP laws) that
imposed onerous medical standards on abortion procedures, requiring
informed consent that warned women of abortion's alleged harms. 14 1
Under this framing, a woman must be protected from the abortion decision
because the choice is harmful to her physical and mental health. This new
woman-protective narrative eclipses the old narrative of protecting fetal
life and tracks closely with the pro-life narrative that abortion devalues
motherhood and harms mothers.
The success of the woman-protective narrative is reflected in the
language ofanti-abortion legislation itself. While traditional abortion laws
refer to abortion as the termination of pregnancy, the woman-protective
model recasts abortion as the termination of a relationship between a
pregnant woman and her child. For example, a woman-protective antiabortion bill introduced in South Dakota in 2011 refers to abortion as "the
decision of a pregnant mother considering termination of her relationship
with her child by an abortion." 1 42 This bill follows a similar bill passed in
2005 by the South Dakota legislature based on the woman-protective
reasoning that "by having an abortion, her existing relationship and her
existing constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be
terminated"; the bill required the doctor to advise the pregnant woman of
all known medical risks of having an abortion, including "depression and
related psychological distress and increased risk of suicide ideation and
suicide." 4 3A separate abortion bill passed in 2006 by the legislature
stated that the purpose of that bill was "to fully protect the rights, interests,

Exposing the MentalHealthEffects of 'PostAbortionSyndrome'Propaganda,in WOMEN, MADNESS,
AND THE LAW: A FEMINIST READER, 169, 172 (Wendy Chan et al. eds., 2005); Emily Bazelon, Is
(Jan.
21,
2007),
Syndrome?,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
There
a
Post-Abortion
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/21/magazine/21abortion.t.html.
141. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings, 125 YALE L.J.
1430, 1444-49 (2019); Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Why Courts Shouldn't Ignore the Facts About
Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/opinion/sunday/
why-courts-shouldnt-ignore-the-facts-about-abortion-rights.html.
142. H.B. 1217, 2012 Legis. Assemb., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011). The bill was halted by an
injunction issued on June 30, 2011. Planned Parenthood v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1052,
1077 (D.S.D. 2011).
143. H.B. 1166,2005 Legis. Assemb., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005). The bill was halted by preliminary
injunction, see Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and the
preliminary injunction was vacated by Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th
Cir. 2012) ("On its face, the suicide advisory presents neither an undue burden on abortion rights nor
a violation of physicians' free speech rights.").
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and health of the pregnant mother ... and the mother's fundamental
natural intrinsic right to a relationship with her child.""
The Supreme Court in its decision in Gonzales v. Carhartemployed
a woman-protective analysis to argue that the decision to choose abortion
harmed women.1 4 5 The Court suggested that women were unable to make
effective decisions in this context because abortion fundamentally harmed
women by breaking the bond between mother and child:
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love
the mother has for her child..

.

. While we find no reliable data to

measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some
women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once
created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem
can follow.1 46

While acknowledging that it lacks scientific "data" upon which to
base its decision, the Court's opinion nevertheless sets forth the narrative
that abortion harms women. The Court stated:
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort
must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound
when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that
she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing
brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human form. 147
The Court further concluded that because women may not understand the
full extent of their choice until later and would come to regret their
decision, the answer was to ban the procedure outright rather than to
require informed consent to the procedure.1 48

144. Women's Health and Human Life Protection Act, H.B. 1215,2006 Legis. Assemb., 81st
Sess. (S.D. 2006) (banning abortion except to save the life of the pregnant woman). The Women's
Health and Human Life Protection Act was repealed by a state-wide referendum on November 7,
2006. South Dakota Vote Against Abortion Ban, 33 J. MED. ETHics 123, 123 (2007). The earlier bill,
House Bill 1166, provided that abortion "will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being," and that the mental and physical health risks ofabortion include depression and suicide
ideation. S.D. H.B. 1166. The woman-protective anti-abortion legislation is based upon the premise
that abortion harms women. See Siegel, supra note 140, at 992.

145. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158-59 (2007).
146. Id. at 159 (citation omitted). It is important to note that the Court's reliance on the
psychological harm of abortion and regret arise not from intact dilation and evacuation ("D & E")
procedure, the most common procedure for a second-trimester abortion, specifically, but from

abortion itself and therefore has wider implications for extending beyond the intact D & E context, to
abortion more generally. See Chris Guthrie, Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of

Regret, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 877, 879-80, 880 n.13 (2008) (arguing that states will use the psychology
of regret from the Carhartdecision to justify wide-ranging constraints on abortion rights generally).
147. Carhart,550 U.S. at 159-60.
148. See id at 159-60, 163.
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2. Protecting Motherhood at a Moment of Diverging
Destinies in 1974
The pro-family movement also gained support from white women,
especially white working-class women, by drawing upon their fears of
economic decline and cultural eclipse at a moment in the mid-1970s when
the nation's economy was slowing and women's destinies were in flux
due to the introduction of the birth control pill. Against this economic and
cultural backdrop, the pro-family movement developed a powerful
message that identified abortion rights and feminism as a threat to
motherhood, traditional family, and American values. The message of
protecting motherhood and the American way of life resonated because of
the economic and cultural context in which it was situated. Stagflation hit
the U.S. economy in 1974 after a thirty-year period of unprecedented postwar prosperity. 149 The abrupt economic slowdown led to the breakdown
of the breadwinner-homemaker idealized family structure due to declining
wages and benefits for workers."' In addition, white male supremacy was
being challenged by movements for women's rights, gay rights, and civil
rights for minorities."' While the birth control pill offered opportunity for
college and career-bound women, for many white women-including
working-class women, stay-at-home mothers, and conservative religious
women-the birth control pill and the social changes in women's roles
that it ushered in posed a threat to a social order that had shaped their lives.
For many religious women and stay-at-home mothers, motherhood was
central to their identity. Contraception and legal access to abortion (which
made motherhood optional) would necessarily devalue their decision to
stay at home and raise families.' 5 2 For white conservative religious
women, cultural shifts and challenges to gender roles upended family as
the central organizing principle of women's lives. The powerful profamily narrative that glorified motherhood was effective because it

149.

See ANDREW J. CHERLiN, LABOR'S LOE LOST: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WORKING-

CLASSFAMLY IN AMERICA 2 (2014) (describing the thirty years after World War H as the "peak
years" of U.S. capitalism in which income inequality was at a historic low and wages were at historic
highs); VACLAV SML, MADE IN THE USA: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURING
69 (2013) (describing the thirty years following World War II as a period of "remarkable singularity"
in which the U.S. dominated the world's production and markets and the wealth generated was shared
by U.S. workers).
150. In 1974, the thirty-year period of unprecedented post-war prosperity came to a halt. Starting
in 1974, a combination of stagnating economic growth and inflation slowed the economy. See, e.g.,
ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE GREAT STAGFLATION 14 (1979); see also Benjamin

Hunt, Oil PriceShocks: Can They Accountfor the Stagflation ofthe 1970s? 29 (Int'lMonetary Fund,
Working Paper No. 215, 2005); see sources cited supra note 149.
151. SELF, supra note 82, at 5-6.
152.

See HAUGEBERG,supra note 20, at 3.
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touched upon the combination of economic and cultural vulnerability felt
by white Americans, and especially white women, who felt their roles as
stay-at-home mothers were challenged and devalued by the introduction
of the birth control pill and the rise in women pursuing higher education
and professional careers. As I will describe below, in the lead-up to the
2016 election, the same economic and cultural vulnerability was
experienced by many white women in the wake of the Great Recession of
2008 and an era bookended by the election of the first African-American
president and the first female candidate to receive the presidential
nomination from a major political party.15 3
In the fight against the ERA and abortion rights, pro-family activists
cast the struggle not as a struggle over equality, but as a struggle for the
value and importance of motherhood. This message resonated with
women who did not work outside the home and understood motherhood
to be the most important work of women's lives.15 4 For example, Phyllis
Schlafly identified women's traditional role in the home as a source of
power and strength and warned that the feminist movement was trying to
"drive the homemaker out of the home" and forbid women to hold
"traditional roles as wives and mothers."1 5 By 1975, the STOP ERA
campaign had broadened its focus to attack feminist values across a broad
range of issues including abortion. 15 6 What had begun as a campaign to
stop the ERA had become a large-scale conservative social movement led
by, and comprised primarily of, white women. 15 7 Schlafly established the
Eagle Forum that year to "confront anti-family forces across the full range
of their attack." 1 5 The new organization explicitly linked religion with
the pro-life and the pro-family agendas that had been separate movements
to that point. By reframing abortion and linking it to traditional family,
Schlafly effectively forged abortion as a powerful symbol of traditional
families and ensured that "[a]bortion [would] remain at the heart of the
conservative defense of traditional family values long after the ERA
was defeated."1 59
In her study of people on both sides of the abortion debate in
Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, sociologist Kristin Luker

153. See infra Part IV.C.
154. See supra note 152 and infra notes 170-171 and accompanying text.
155. Sally Quinn, 'The Pedestal Has Crashed', WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1977, at Bl,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1977/11/23/the-pedestal-has-crashed/278835flb3b5-4d75-8f93-059cc6309248; see SPRUILL, supranote 3, at 12.
156. SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 111.
157. Id. at 112.
158. Id. at 111.
159. Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel, Preface to Schlafly, supra note 76, at 218-19.
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similarly found that in the wake of Roe v. Wade, pro-life activists were
primarily married white women with a high school education who
identified pregnancy and motherhood as central to their lives and
16 0
understood motherhood to be a source of personal self-worth. Her study
found that for women who see home and family as central to women's
identity and natural role, "abortion is wrong because it fosters and
supports a world view that deemphasizes (and therefore downgrades) the
traditional roles of men and women." 1 6 ' Because pro-life women are
significantly less likely to work outside the home, they see abortion and
contraception as "devalu[ing] the one secure resource left to these women:
the private world of home and hearth."16 2 In short, "abortion has become
a symbolic marker between those who wish to maintain this division of
labor and those who wish to challenge it."1 6 3 Professor Luker concludes
by observing that the women in her study who make up the pro-life
movement are fighting to support a way of life that they perceive is under
assault. As more and more women combine career and motherhood, those
who choose to be stay-at-home mothers-working-class, middle-class,
1
and religious women-feel that their way of life is devalued. 6
Indeed, support for abortion access closely tracks religiosity and
education level. While opposition to abortion did not historically align
with either political party or religious affiliation' 65 -with the exception of
Catholicsl 6 6 -one predictor of opposition to abortion has remained
constant, even before the shifting agenda of the New Right: those in the
working class have consistently opposed abortion. Between 1965 and
167
1980 the best predictor of abortion attitudes was education level.
During this period, educated elites supported abortion rights while
working- and lower-middle-class voters opposed abortion. 168 Moreover,
while support for abortion has come to more closely align with political
party and religiosity over time, the correlation between education level
and support for abortion has not changed but rather has remained constant.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See LUKER, supra note 17, at 138, 145.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 213-14.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 217.
See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.

166.

But see JOHN PORTMANN, CATHOLIC CULTURE IN THE USA: IN AND OUT OF CHURCH 92

(2010) (indicating that between 1987 and 1993 Catholic women's support for abortion rights
increased from thirty-four percent in 1987 to fifty-six percent in 1993).
167. See Donald Granberg & Beth Wellman Granberg, Abortion Attitudes, 1965-1980: Trends
andDeterminants, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 250, 253-54 (1980).
168. Peter Skerry, The Class Conflict Over Abortion, PUB. INT., Summer 1978, at 74-75; see

Devins, supra note 38, at 950; Granberg & Wellman Granberg, supra note 167, at 253-54.
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Consider a recent poll conducted by Pew Research Center in 2019, for
example, finding that while seventy percent of college graduates say
abortion should be legal in all or most cases, only fifty-four percent of
those with a high school degree or less say abortion should be legal in all
or most cases. 16 9 The college-educated middle class and the working class
have significantly different views on abortion.
Religious women who value traditional gender roles have also often
felt that their traditional roles in the home were devalued by legal access
to abortion and the transformation of women's roles in the public
sphere. 7 0 Religious women tend to center motherhood and family while
opposing abortion. For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s many
working-class Catholic women felt anxious about the dramatic changes in
men's and women's roles taking place after the introduction of the birth
control pill that allowed women to enter college and professional life and
ushered in the sexual revolution. For women who followed traditional
religious teachings, "feminists' support for birth control, abortion, and
gender equality [was seen] as indictments of their decisions to marry
young, forgo careers, and raise large families."17
In his survey of the profound cultural and political shifts that
redefined U.S. democracy from 1960 to the present, Robert 0. Self finds
that the conservative backlash of the early 1970s saw feminism and the
ERA as a threat to their values, worldview, and way of life.1 72 Chief
169. Public Opinion on Abortion: Views on Abortion, 1995-2019, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 29,
2019), http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion;
see also Lydia Saad,
Education Trumps Gender in Predicting Support for Abortion, GALLUP (Apr. 28, 2010),

https://news.gallup.com/poll/127559/education-trumps-gender-predicting-support-abortion.aspx.
170.

See LUKER, supra note 17, at 206 (observing that, "the more limited the educational

credentials a woman has, the more limited the job opportunities are for her, and the more limited the
job opportunities, the more attractive motherhood is as afull-time occupation."); SELF, supra note 82,
at 281-82. Sociologist Michble Lamont found the same to be true for working class men. Her study
in the 1990s found that working-class men during this period frequently valued family as the most
important aspect of their lives and viewed work as a means ofproviding for their families rather than
as a source of prestige or fulfillment. She concluded that because working-class men had limited
socioeconomic opportunities and often worked in jobs with lower social prestige, they constructed an
identity that measured self-worth by self-reliance, hard work, and the ability to support and provide
for one's family. MICHtLE LAMONT, THE DIGNITY OF WORKING MEN: MORALITY AND THE
BOUNDARIES OF RACE, CLASS, AND IMMIGRATION 29 (2000) (describing the interview with one
worker as typical of the attitudes of the group stating, "Family is very important in my life. You need

to work to support your family. So, I don't worry about a job. Imean, I don't care what I have to do,
I'll go out and do it to support my family."). Andrew Cherlin has similarly described the way in which
many working-class men placed greater importance on their home and family life because family life
was "the only place in their lives where they could be in charge-a setting where they could
compensate for the lack of authority and autonomy in the workplace." CHERLIN, supra note 149, at
116.
171.

HAUGEBERG, supra note 20, at 3.

172.

See SELF, supranote 82, at 3-5, 283.
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among the perceived threats to family and motherhood was abortion. As
Professor Self notes, the abortion debate transformed from the focus on
fetal life of the 1960s, to a distinctly anti-feminist, pro-family referendum
on feminism and family values in the early 1970s.1 73 Professor Self has
found that "[t]he white middle-class nuclear family headed by a patriotic
and heterosexual male" became emblematic of the period of cultural and
political struggle between 1969 and 2004, what he has termed
"breadwinner conservatism." 174 The rising conservative family values
movement sought to defend this idealized American family against moral
threats from feminism, abortion, and gay rights."' This conservative
opposition arose in response to the civil rights movements of the 1960s
and 1970s for racial equality, women's equality, and rights for sexual
minorities. 17 6 Inshort, the 1960s and 1970s social movements challenged
the liberal version of the idealized nuclear family by upending existing
sexual and gender norms and demanding a seat at the table of power and
equal citizenship. 1 77
D.

Defense ofMotherhood and Nation and Opposition to Abortion

The forging of the anti-abortion movement as an anti-feminist, promotherhood movement was the link that galvanized white women and
brought together two previously distinct political movements: the antiERA and the pro-life movements. 1 78 The pro-family movement changed
tack in the mid-1970s, broadening its message to attack feminism and
abortion rights based on ideals of traditional family, motherhood, and
fundamentalist Christian values."' Specifically, and most effectively,
anti-ERA opponents such as Phyllis Schlafly brought together for the first
time anti-ERA and pro-life groups."s They highlighted that both of these
movements-the anti-ERA and the pro-life movement-were, at their
most fundamental, a struggle over a way of life that was under assault as
both the ERA and abortion rights degraded the value of traditional

173. See id. at 284, 290-91.
174. Id. at 4-6.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 4-7.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 293-94 (noting that Schlafly's STOP ERA activism between 1973-1977 that extolled
the role of motherhood and traditional family would morph later in the decade into the pro-family
movement).

179. Robert O. Self describes that the anti-ERA activism not only stopped the amendment in its
tracks, but was the beginning of"unapologetically fundamentalist Christian antifeminism." Id at295.
180.

SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 10.
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families and motherhood. 1 8 ' This rhetorical shift brought together the
ideal of the traditional homemaker-breadwinner family that had been so
central to post-war ideology and identified abortion rights as a threat to
this way of life. And the pro-life movement drew an explicit connection
between opposition to abortion and protection of American culture and
values. As Lottie Beth Hobbs, a conservative activist at the time, noted,
women's rights and abortion "strikes at the very foundation of family life,
and the home as the foundation of our nation."1 8 2 This new conservative,
pro-life, pro-family coalition was united under a common set of beliefs
that included "Godliness, the family and home, the sanctity of life and the
support of sound government."l 83
The intertwining of the protection of motherhood and the protection
of American culture and values is clear in a 1972 publication Abortion
and Social Justice published by Americans United for Life,1 8 4 which
claimed that abortion was:
The faithless abandonment of women and children, which is so overtly
promoted in today's society, is rapidly becoming a part of "Americana."
People unthinkingly promote and advocate it as much as they were all
for Mom and apple pie in times past. Even the women themselves have
undertaken this battle for abandonment, and all under the guise
of"liberation!"] 85
The pamphlet reveals the ways in which not simply fetal life but the
defense of women, children, and American values were all deployed in
anti-abortion messaging. The anti-ERA movement was recast as an antifeminist, pro-motherhood movement. 1 86 Anti-ERA activists in the mid-

181. A Republican strategist at the time, Dick Behn, observed that a new coalition of "social
conservatives" had been forged that included groups that "range from Catholic right-to-lifers to
Protestant fundamentalists to members of the Mormon Relief Society.... [who] often hated one
another before" would now vote together under the pro-family anti-abortion banner. SPRUILL, supra
note 3, at 193; Behn, supra note 134; see also SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 10; THOMSON, supra note
119, at 92-102. Seegenerally RUTHMURRAYBROWN, FORA"CHRISTIAN AMERICA": AHISTORYOF

THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT (2002) (tracing the history of the growth ofthe religious right in America from
the 1970s to the early 2000s).
182. SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 100 (citing Lottie Beth Hobbs, Ladies!Have You Heard? (on file
at Box 3, Dunaway Papers, Emory University)).
183. Id. at 196 (describing protest resolutions prepared by the Southern Methodist Church and
sent to then-President Jimmy Carter).
184. Americans United for Life (AUL), founded in 1971, is one of the country's oldest national
pro-life organizations. Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel, Preface to Horan et al., supra note 75, at
88,88.
185. Thomas W. Hilgers et al., Is Abortion the Best We Have to Offer? A Challenge to the
Abortive Society, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 177-80 (Thomas W. Hilgers & Dennis J. Horan
eds., 1972), reprintedin BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 41, at 92, 93.

186.

See SELF, supra note 82, at 294-95 (noting that Schlafly's STOP ERA activism focused on
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1970s broadened their message from opposition to the ERA to an attack
on feminism and abortion rights as threatening ideals of traditional family,
motherhood, American, and fundamentalist Christian values."'
The symbolic power of abortion as antithetical to American values
was perhaps most effectively wielded in the presidential campaign of
1972. Richard Nixon had come out in opposition to abortion and his
campaign strategists-Patrick Buchanan among them-used the abortion
issue as a way to woo Catholic and conservative voters away from the
Democratic Party."' Critically, South Dakota Senator George McGovern,
who was seeking the Democratic Party presidential nomination, was
targeted by the right for supporting abortion rights, amnesty for those who
evaded the Vietnam War draft, and the counter-culture youth
movement. 189 Senate Republicans referred to McGovern as the "triple-A
candidate" for abortion, amnesty, and "acid" (representing youth counterculture). 19 0As Reva Siegel and Linda Greenhouse have observed, this
proved a powerful claim because "[a]bortion, in this usage, broadly
signified a refusal to conform to traditional social norms-to practice
restraint (in sex and drugs) and to fulfill role obligations requiring women
to raise children and men to defend family and nation."1 91 As a Republican
Party strategist at the time explained, the strategy was designed to "link
McGovern to a culture and morality that is anathema to Middle
America .. . as a radical whose election could jeopardize the fabric and
stability of American society." 19 2 n"assault book" drafted by Buchanan
that set out a strategy for the 1972 presidential campaign outlined a list of
social issues, abortion listed first, followed by "Racial Questions
Concerns" that included "integration of the suburbs," and "forced
bussing/racial balance."l 9 3The strategy was effective and Nixon won the
election with a majority of votes in forty-nine states. 194 More importantly,
the campaign had revealed the power of opposition to abortion as part of

motherhood and the traditional family would be the impetus for the pro-family movement in the late
1970s).
187. Robert 0. Self noted that "unapologetically fundamentalist Christian antifeminism"
emerged as a result of anti-ERA activism. SELF, supra note 82, at 295.
188. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel, Preface to Memorandum from Patrick Buchanan to
Richard Nixon (1972), in BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 41, at 215, 215-16.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 216.
191. Id.
192.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

193. Memorandum from Patrick Buchanan, Advisor to the President, to Richard Nixon,
President of the United States (1972) (archived at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and
Museum), reprintedin BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 41, at 215, 215-16.

194. Preface to Memorandum, supra note 188, at216.
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a larger narrative that responded to white fears of economic strain and
social and cultural eclipse triggered by the movements to end the war in
Vietnam, civil rights, sexual freedom, and women's liberation in
the mid-1970s.
The watershed moment that brought together the messaging of the
New Right came in Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign in the lead up
to the 1980 election. If the rhetoric of the pro-family movement was
incubated in the mid-1970s, its power was fully harnessed by the ReaganBush campaign. It was the Reagan-Bush campaign that first coined the
slogan that promised to "Make America Great Again." 9 5 During his
campaign, Reagan promised to "take back [our] country." 9 6 Ronald
Reagan had been a moderate Republican who opposed anti-gay legislation
and signed into law liberal abortion laws in 1967 as governor of
California. 1 97 However, when the Republican Party was transformed by
the pro-family movement between 1976 and 1980, Reagan changed his
positions to align with those of the New Right.'9 8 During his presidential
campaign, Reagan advocated for a constitutional amendment against
abortion and openly advocated for the agenda of the pro-life family values
movement and the Christian right.' 9 9 Once elected, he was the first
president to fill openings in his administration using a pro-life litmus
test. 2 During his presidency in 1983, Reagan reiterated the narrative of
the pro-life movement when addressing a convention of evangelicals,
stating: "The fight against parental notification [for abortion] is really only
one example of many attempts to water down traditional values and even
abrogate the original terms of American democracy."201

195. See, e.g., Flivio Azevedo et al., "Making America Great Again": System Justificationin
the U.S. PresidentialElection of2016, 3 TRANSLATIONAL ISSUES IN PSYCHOL. Sci. 231, 232 (2017);
William F. Lewis, Telling America's Story: Narrative Form and the Reagan Presidency, 73 Q.J.
SPEECH 280, 282-83 (1987); Lynn Vavreck, Trump's Approach Is More Like Reagan's Than You
Might Think, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/upshot/trump-maybe-more-like-reagan-than-you-think.html (noting that Trump has adopted Reagan's tag line "Make
America Great Again"). For a comprehensive biography of Ronald Reagan, see H.W. BRANDS,
REAGAN: THE LIFE (2015).

196. SPRUILL, supranote 3, at 336.
197. See, e.g., Brian Pendleton, Note, The California TherapeuticAbortion Act: An Analysis, 19
HASTINGS L.J. 242, 242 (1967).
198. SELF, supra note 82, at 369.
199. See GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 228; SELF, supra note 82, at 367-69.
200. See GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 228; Julie Johnson, Reagan Vows to Continue Battle on
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1989, at 8, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/14/us/reagan-vows-tocontinue-battle-on-abortion.html.
201. Marjorie Hunter, Court Blocks Rule on Notice by Family Planning Clinics, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 1983, at A5, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/07/09/us/court-blocks-rule-on-notice-by-familyplanning-clinics.html (discussing a federal appellate decision to disallow the Secretary of Health and
Human Services from requiring "federally financed family planning clinics to notify the parents of
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The pro-family movement effectively recast the feminist call for
equality and reproductive rights as a threat to the traditional nuclear
family, motherhood, and American and Christian values. The argument
rested on a narrative that fundamental guiding principles of gender roles,
family, and the homemaker-breadwinner organization of family life were
under assault. 2 0 2 In so doing, the movement elevated opposition to
abortion rights beyond the realm of political and moral beliefs, to a
struggle over cultural identity and way of life. This has important
ramifications for understanding the rise of conservative pro-family, antiabortion movements in times of economic recession and perceived
cultural displacement, especially among white women in the U.S. 2 03
IV.

TRUMP BEATS THE DRUM: MOTHERHOOD, NATIONALISM,

AND

THE RHETORIC OF "MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN"

Donald Trump has engaged in explicitly nationalistic rhetoric during
his presidential campaign. For example, he used the "America First"
slogan apparently unaware of its direct reference to Nazi propaganda
slogans. 2 What is more, he declared himself a nationalist in a speech in
Houston, saying "You know what I am? I'm a nationalist, O.K.? I'm a
nationalist. Nationalist! Use that word! Use that word!" 20 5 As described
above, the rhetoric of motherhood and family in movements for
nationalism is not new to the pro-family movement of the mid-1970s or
Trump's rhetoric. This Part examines how Trump harnessed the rhetoric
of the pro-family movement to capture the majority of white women's
vote in the 2016 election. Specifically, it investigates how in the long
shadow of the Great Recession of 2008 and amidst fears of cultural
eclipse, Trump's campaign employed nationalistic rhetoric that conflated

young women who were given birth control devices.").
202.

See SELF, supra note 82, at 297.

203.

A similar scapegoating function has been identified as occurring with respect to restrictive

immigration policy in response to declining jobs and wage growth. See, e.g., RAY ALLEN
BtLLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE 1800-1860: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN

NATIVISM322 (Quadrangle Books, Inc. 1964) (1938) ("Many Americans believed that the influx of
aliens threatened their established social structure, endangered the nation's economic welfare, and
spelled doom for the existing governmental system."); BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA
THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 52 (Jo Carrillo et al. eds., 2004) (noting that in the early 1900s the

American Federation of Labor was a driving force behind immigration restrictions because
immigration was seen as a threat to the security ofU.S. workers). For example, "[t]o many [American]
workers, the depression of the 1870s was due entirely to the competition ofthe Chinese. Exclusion of
[the] Chinese became the supposed remedy for economic injustice and imbalances." HING, supra, at

31.
204.

SeePeterBaker, 'You Know WhatlAm? I'm aNationalist.',N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2018, at

Al2,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/nationalist-president-trump.html.
205. Id.
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motherhood and traditional family with protecting the nation's borders,
culture, and values from the threat of immigration and the political left.
A.

DonaldTrump and the Family-Values Playbook: Defense of
Motherhood, Family, andNation

Donald Trump was the least likely candidate to earn the support of
the conservative evangelical right during the presidential primaries. 206 He
seemed even less likely to gain the votes of women after he made
egregious sexist and misogynist remarks during his campaign.2 0 7 Phyllis
Schlafly played a critical but often-overlooked role in Donald Trump
securing the support of white evangelicals in the 2016 presidential
primary. As described above, Schlafly, who in the mid-1970s merged the
pro-life, anti-abortion, and anti-communist movements into a powerful
pro-family movement, is largely credited with re-shaping the Republican
party and setting the forces in motion for the Reagan Revolution of the
1980s.2 0 8She tapped Trump, the thrice-divorced former Democrat with a
morally ambiguous record who made a fortune, in part, running casinos. 2 0 9
In light of his history, Trump seemed like the least likely candidate to have
won the support of Schlafly and conservative Christian evangelicals.2 10
As the presidential primaries were getting underway, Schlafly met

206. Trump has been divorced three times, and had once been a pro-choice Democrat. SPRUILL,
supranote 3, at 335; see Chris Moody, Trump in '04:' ProbablyIdentify More as aDemocrat,CNN

(Jul. 22, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/21/politics/donald-trump-election-democrat; Trump in
1999: 'I am Very Pro-Choice', NBC NEWS (July 8, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-thepress/video/trump-in-1999-i-am-very-pro-choice-480297539914
[hereinafter Russert Interview]
(declaring, in a Meet the Press interviewwith Tim Russert, that despite his aversion toward abortion,
he was "very pro-choice"). The billionaire television personality had left a long string of scandalous
behavior in his wake. See SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 335-36. What is more, he was not familiar with

Christian ideas and the Bible. Id. (describing that on the campaign trail he invoked "Two Corinthians"
while addressing students at Liberty University); see also, Michelle Boorstein, All the Presidents at
the Bush FuneralService Together Recited This Core Prayer. Except One, WASH. POST: BLOGS (Dec.

5, 2018, 10:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2018/12/05/all-presidents-bushfuneral-service-together-recited-this-core-prayer-except-trump

(describing that in a more recent

controversy, Trump appeared not to know the words to the Apostles' Creed while attending the
funeral of former President George H.W. Bush).
207. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
208. See JEAN HARDISTY, MOBILIZING RESENTMENT: CONSERVATIVE RESURGENCE FROM THE
JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY TO THE PROMISE KEEPERS 75-76 (1999) (crediting Schlafly with developing
and delivering social conservatives and anti-feminists to the New Right); TANYA MELICH, THE
REPUBLICAN WAR AGAINST WOMEN: AN INSIDER'S REPORT FROM BEHIND THE LINES 91 (1996)

(recognizing that Schlafly had "built a Religious Right constituency of fundamentalist and evangelical
women in the South" and made a crucial contribution to the conservative movement by showing them
that they could win); SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 298-99.
209. SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 335-36.

210.

Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss1/3

36

Lindgren: Trump's Angry White Women: Motherhood, Nationalism, and Abortion

2019]

TRUMP'S ANGRY WHITE WOMEN

37

privately with Trump in St. Louis. Trump emerged from the meeting
promising to support Schlafly's pro-life position and support the agenda
of the Religious Right. 2 1 1 Not long after, she appeared on national
television to declare her endorsement of Trump.2 12 Schlafly's
endorsement was critical in Trump securing the GOP nomination and
quelling lingering suspicions of conservatives of the previously prochoice Democrat.2 13 One commentator observed that Schlafly's
endorsement allowed Trump to "tap[] into her old base through his call
for 'Making America Great Again' and securing the nation's borders.
Trump's nomination as the Republican Party's candidate for president
marked Schlafly's final victory."214
Like Ronald Reagan's before him, Trump's candidacy occurred in
the wake of a significant economic downturn, the Great Recession of
2008, and amid serious challenges to white male supremacy. Trump
emerged from the 2016 meeting with Phyllis Schlafly prepared to fully
embrace the family-values playbook. He asserted himself as a pro-life
2 15
candidate and promised to nominate pro-life judges to the bench.
Trump had previously declared his support for abortion rights, stating, "I
am very pro-choice. I hate the concept of abortion. I hate it. I hate
everything it stands for. I cringe when I listen to people debating the
subject. But you still-I just believe in choice." 2 1 6 In describing his
"change of heart" on the abortion issue, he explicitly recalled
Ronald Reagan:
I've evolved on many issues over the years. And you know who else
has? Is [sic] Ronald Reagan evolved on many issues. And I am prolife.... I hate the concept of abortion. And then since then, I've very
much evolved.... And I am very, very proud to say that I am pro-life. 217

211. Id.at336-37.
212. Id.
213. Indeed, the archconservative BreitbartlNews, declared that Schlafly's support ofTrump "is
certain to reverberate across the 2016 electorate." Julia Hahn, Phyllis Schlafly Makes the Casefor
President Trump: 'Only Hope to Defeat the Kingmakers', BREIrBART (Jan. 10, 2016),
https://breitbart.com/politics/2016/01/10/Phyllis-schlafly-makes-the-case-for-president-trump.
214. Donald T. Critchlow, Opinion, How Phyllis Schlaly Led America to Donald Trump,
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 8, 2016, 9:04 PM), https://marketwatch.com/story/how-phyllis-schlafly-ledamerica-to-donald-tnump-2016-09-08.
215. Donald Trump, Remarks at the Family Research Council's 11th Annual Values Voter
Summit (Sept. 9, 2016) (transcript available at https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/full-texttrump-values-voter-summit-remarks-227977) [hereinafter Trump Values Voter Summit Remarks]
(promising to keep the Supreme Court from falling into the hands of liberals that would result in "a
country that is no longer your country").
216. Russert Interview, supra note 206.
217. Donald Trump, Response during the FOX News Channel/Facebook Ohio Republican Party
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In keeping with the pro-familyplaybook of the mid-1970s, his appeal
to pro-life voters links opposition to abortion with the protection of
national heritage and shared values and culture rather than to protection
of fetal life. Speaking to the Susan B. Anthony List Annual Campaign for
Life Gala, Trump told the crowd, "Every day between now and November
we must work together to elect more lawmakers who share our values,
cherish our heritage, and proudly stand for life." 2 1 8 In sspeech to the
Values Voters Summit, Trump promised that under "a Trump
administration, our Christian heritage will be cherished, protected,
defended like you've never seen before." 219 He promised to appoint
Supreme Court justices that oppose abortion and to keep the Supreme
Court from falling into the hands of liberals, which would result in "a
country that is no longer your country." 2 2 0 Trump had tapped into an antiabortion narrative that conflated opposition to abortion with the protection
of a Christian national identity.
Trump consistently conflated opposition to abortion with protection
of family, nation, and American and Christian values. As the first sitting
president to address the National March for Life, via live teleprompter,
Trump told the crowd: "Today, tens of thousands of families, students,
and patriots .. . gather here .... You love your families, you love your
neighbors, you love our nation, and you love every child, born and
unborn." 2 2 1In his Campaign For Life Gala speech he declared: "We
celebrate all lives . . . as long as we have faith in our citizens, confidence
in our values and trust in our God, we will never, ever fail. Our nation will
thrive, our people will prosper, and America will be greater than ever

at
available
2015)
(transcript
(Aug.
6,
Debate
Main
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-candidates-debate-cleveland-ohio);seealso
David Brody, DonaldTrump ExplainsPro-Life Conversion, CBNNEWS: BRODY FILE (Apr. 8,2011),
https://wwwl.cbn.com/thebrodyfile/archive/2011/04/08/brody-file-exclusive-donald-trumpexplains-pro-life-conversion.
218. President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump at the Susan B. Anthony List 11th
at
(transcript
available
22,
2018)
Life
Gala
(May
Campaign
for
Annual
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-susan-b-anthony-list11th-annual-campaign-life-gala) [hereinafter Trump Susan B. Anthony List Remarks]; see also Jill
Colvin, Trump Urges Anti-Abortion Advocates to Votefor Republicans, PBS NEWSHOUR (May 22,

2018, 6:12 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-live-truimp-addresses-anti-abortionadvocates-at-campaign-for-life-gala (quoting Donald Trump's remarks at the Susan B. Anthony
List's Campaign for Life Gala).
219. Trump Values Voter Summit Remarks, supra note 215.
220. Id.
221. President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump to March for Life Participants and
19, 2018) (transcript available at
Pro-Life Leaders at the white House (Jan.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-march-life-participantspro-life-leaders).
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before." 2 2 2His narrative links patriotism, love of family, and love of
nation with anti-abortion ideology. This is a familiar narrative of
nationalist movements that identifies protecting families and opposition
to abortion as necessary to preserving the nation.
Trump's theme of protecting America from the threat of outsiders
has been a powerful draw for support among white women. A recent New
York Times article on white women's support for Trump in the lead-up to
the midterm elections concluded that "it is [white women's] visceral fear
of immigrants and raw anger about changes in cultural mores . .. that

appear to be driving the intensity of their support for the president."2 2 3 At
campaign rallies, Trump both addresses and stokes women's anxieties
about threats to America including immigrants, rising crime, and a
looming economic downturn if Democrats gain power.2 24 Trump seeks to
instill fear of immigration by linking it to national security. At a recent
rally in Belgrade, Montana, he argued that "[b]order security is very much
a woman's issue. Women want security. They do not want that
caravan." 22 5In a rally in West Virginia before the midterm elections he
said of women, "[tihey don't want to have these people coming in. Some
of these people are just horrible people. You have to see the crimes
they've committed." 226
Trump explicitly calls on women's support by linking their interest
in protecting their families and children in safe neighborhoods with
protecting the nation's borders. At a recent campaign rally he told the
crowd: "Women want safe neighborhoods for their families, they want
great schools, healthcare for their children. They want to keep drug
dealers and predators and traffickers

..

. they want them out of our

country and we do that. The Democrats don't do that, they want the
open borders." 2 2 7Like the New Right movement of the 1970s, in his
appeal to white women voters Trump draws explicit connections between
women's interests in protecting their families and communities and the
president's role in protecting national borders. As one white female at a
recent rally summed up her support: "He understands why we're angry

222.

Trump Susan B. Anthony List Remarks, supranote 218.

223. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis& Katie Rogers, At Trump Rallies, Women See a HeroProtecting
a Way ofLife, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2018, at A25, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/us/politics/
trump-women.html.

224.
225.

Id.
Id.

226. Morgan Brinlee, Trump Claimed Border Security Is a Women's Issue for a Pretty
Stereotypical Reason, BUSTLE (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/trump-claimed-border-

security-is-a-womens-issue-for-a-pretty-stereotypical-reason-13086621.
227. Id
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and he wants to fix it," she said, "[h]e wants to protect this country, and
he wants to keep it safe, and he wants to keep it free of invaders and the
caravan and everything else that's going on."2 2 8 In short, the women
interviewed supported Mr. Trump because they believe that he is fighting
to preserve a way of life that is being threatened by outsiders and the
liberal Democratic Party.2 2 9
Like the pro-family pro-life movement of the 1970s, Trump asserted
the authority of white male privilege against the perceived threat of being
eclipsed by white college-educated professional women. He challenged
the authority of professional elite women that threatened the power and
privilege of white male authority when he mocked and stalked Hillary
Clinton on the stage during their televised presidential debate. 23 0 His
supporters at campaign rallies frequently engaged in chants against his
opponent to "Trump that bitch" and "[k]ill her." 231 Indeed, rather than
gendered missteps, Trump's behavior on the campaign trail that degraded
and humiliated women seemed calculated to appeal to a white base of
traditional voters, especially traditional white women who had lower
education and therefore stayed at home, or had traditional values around
family structures and gender roles. His actions and rhetoric called upon
the conflict forged by the family values movement between white
working-class and traditional women and women in the college-educated
professional elite. Contextualized in the family values playbook, Trump's
misogynistic rhetoric seemed to be perfectly tailored dog-whistle politics
designed to reach those who embraced the patriarchal family and stay-athome motherhood.
B.

Trump Embraces the Legacy ofPhyllis Schlafly

Trump's anti-immigrant, anti-establishment, pro-life message fell in
lock-step with the pro-family, pro-life, anti-communist, and antiimmigrant message developed in the mid-1970s that came to full-force in
the 1980s with the election of Ronald Reagan. The Reagan-Bush
campaign developed the "Make America Great Again" slogan along with
their promise to "take back our country."232 Phyllis Schlafly had long
decried immigration as a threat to the survival of American culture and

228. Hirschfeld Davis & Rogers, supra note 223.
229. Id.
230.

See Alastair Jamieson, 2016 PresidentialDebate: Trump Accused of 'Stalking' Clinton on

Stage, NBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-presidential-debatetrump-accused-stalking-clinton-stage-n663516.
231.

SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 336.

232. Id.
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had called for a secure "fence" along the Southern border.2 3 3 In the wake
of his anointment by Schlafly, Trump engaged her familiar messaging to
woo anti-abortion voters. In a speech to the Values Voters Summit, Trump
conflated his anti-abortion position with protection of American values,
promising that under "a Trump administration, our Christian heritage will
be cherished, protected, defended like you've never seen before." 23 4 He
promised to appoint Supreme Court justices that opposed abortion and to
keep the Supreme Court from falling into the hands of liberals, which
would result in "a country that is no longer your country." 23 5 Trump had
tapped into an anti-abortion narrative that merged opposition to abortion
with the protection of a Christian national identity. This Part examines
how conflating national identity, white motherhood, and opposition to
abortion serves as a powerful tool in mobilizing white female voters.
Schlafly passed the pro-life baton to Donald Trump at their meeting
in St. Louis in 2016.236 The transfer of power made sense: Trump's
rhetoric has deep reverberations with messaging of the pro-family
movement of which Schlafly is just one highly-visible proponent. In the
shadow of economic decline and transformations in the role of American
women, the conservative revolution of the mid-1970s crafted a message
that brought together defense of motherhood, traditional family, and the
defense of American values.
C.

Trump Supporters and FearofEconomic and Cultural
Displacement

Polling conducted in the wake of the Trump election reveals that fear
of cultural displacement may have been a driving factor in white,
especially white working class, support for Trump's presidency.2 3 7 As one
233. Id. at 337. In an updated 2014 edition of her book, A Choice Not an Echo, Schlafly sets out
seven "key" issues to focus on in the 2016 presidential election, including immigration and border
security: "Americans must demand border security, a double fence, more border guards, compulsory
use of E-Verify, the tracking of visitor's visas .. . and an end to the practice of granting automatic
citizenship to 'anchor babies."' SCHLAFLY, supra note 9, at 265.
234. Trump Values Voter Summit Remarks, supra note 215.

235. Id.
236. See SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 336.
237. White working-class voters supported Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton by a margin of
roughly two-to-one. NPR, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. & HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB.
HEALTH, DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: EXPERIENCES AND VIEWS OF WHITE AMERICANS 5 (2017),
[hereinafter
https://www.npr.org/documents/2017/oct/discrimination-whites-final.pdf
DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA REPORT] (consisting of a survey of 902 white U.S. adults conducted

January 26-April 9, 2017, as part of a larger series on discrimination in America); Daniel Cox et al.,
Beyond Economics: Fears of CulturalDisplacement Pushed the White Working Class to Trump I
PRRI/The Atlantic Report, PRRI (May 9, 2017), https://www.prri.org/research/white-working-classattitudes-economy-trade-immigration-election-donald-trump [hereinafterPRRI/The Atlantic Report];
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commentator observed, an era bookended by the elections-first of the
nation's first African American president and then of Donald Trumphas experienced significant social shifts. 2 3 8 The resulting turmoil is
evidenced by high-profile battles over the removal of Confederate
monuments, the growth in whiteness studies courses on college campuses,
the battles over immigration and affirmative action, and a rising death rate
among middle-aged, lower-educated white Americans from drugs,
alcohol, and suicide-deaths of despair. 2 3 9 The anxiety of many in the
white working class in the U.S. over fear of being culturally displaced is
reflected in the increasingly racially polarized electorate and in the
mainstreaming of white nationalism with their chant: "You will not
replace us." 24 0 These demographic changes and political movements each
challenged the supremacy of what Robert 0. Self described as the white
middle-class heterosexual male head of a nuclear household who make up
"breadwinner conservatism."241
Polling of the white working-class voters who supported Trump in
the 2016 election reveals that economic anxiety and fear of cultural
displacement lead these voters to shift their support to Trump and his antiimmigration, pro-American political rhetoric. 2 4 2 The data reveals deep
frustration among the white working class at their perceived loss of a past
way of life: A 2017 poll conducted by Public Religious Research Institute
found that nearly two-thirds of white working-class people in the U.S.
believe American culture and way of life has deteriorated since the
1950s. 2 4 3Nearly half of white working class respondents say that "things
have changed so much that I often feel like a stranger in my own

Don Gonyea, Majority of White Americans Say They Believe Whites Face Discrimination,NPR:
SPECIAL SERIES: YOU, ME AND THEM: EXPERIENCING DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA (Oct. 24,2017),

https://www.npr.org/2017/10/24/559604836/majority-of-white-americans-think-theyrediscriminated-against; see also WILLIAMS,

supra note 2, at 75 (noting that Trump won the votes of

white working-class women by a margin of twenty-eight percentage points); Silver, supra note 2.
238. See Michele Norris & Gillian Laub, The Rising Anxiety of White America, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC, Apr. 2018, at 79, 88.
239. See id.
240. Id.
241.

SELF, supra note 82, at 4-6.

242. In her recent book, Strangers in Their Own Land, sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild
draws similar conclusions that Tea Party membership is animated by fear of cultural eclipse and
economic decline. Professor Hochschild concludes that virtually all the Tea Party members she spoke
to embraced a common "feels-as-if' story in which they feel like they are on shaky economic ground
and are culturally marginalized. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND:
ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT 221 (2016) (noting that many in the Tea Party feel

as if "their views about abortion, gay marriage, gender roles, race, guns, and the Confederate flag all
were held up to ridicule in the national media as backward.").
243.

PRRI/The Atlantic Report, supra note 237.
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country." 2 " This research concludes that a common theme that underlies
the Tea Party's intertwining of libertarian economics, distrust of big
government, anti-immigration policy, and conservative social values is a
longing for a lost way of life and a fear of being economically and
socially eclipsed.2 45
The polling data and research suggest that perceived threats to white
male hegemony were a factor that drove white working class voters to
turn to the Tea Party and Donald Trump's candidacy. For example, a poll
conducted in 2016 found that a majority ofwhites-fifty-five percentbelieve that there is discrimination against white people in the United
States today. 2 46 "Lower- and moderate-income white Americans were
more likely to say that whites are discriminated against," as were
respondents who identified as Republican. 2 4 7 As one commentator
observed, the polling data "reinforce[s] a lot of the resentment you saw in
the 2016 election, especially among white, working-class voters lacking a
college degree." 24 8 The data reflects the larger fears of cultural
displacement that drove voters to support Donald Trump's candidacy,
especially among white working-class voters in battleground states of
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania.24 9
These polls suggest that white working-class support for Mr. Trump
was based on fears of "cultural displacement" and an "identity crisis"
among whites without college educations that was rooted in their "fear
that African-Americans and immigrants were undermining their position
as the majority group."250 What is more, Trump's challenger, Hillary
Clinton, the first woman to earn the presidential nomination of a major
party in the nation's history, triggered fears of cultural displacement of
white male hegemony. As sociologist Andrew Cherlin recently noted, it
is impossible to disentangle:
[W]hether culture or economics was the driving force in Mr. Trump's
win.... [T]hose who try to distinguish between the explanatory power
of stagnant wages and a declining industrial base on the one hand, and

244. Id.
245. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 242, at 221, 225.
246.

DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA REPORT, supra note 237, at 2.

247. Gonyea, supra note 237.
248. Id. (citing University of Akron political scientist David Cohen). Cohen further clarified his
position: "I'm not sure [Mr. Trump] necessarily created the angst among white voters but he certainly
knew how to take advantage of it." Id.
249. See id.
250.

2018,

Andrew J. Cherlin, Opinion, Money and Culture Are Inseparable, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,

at

A25,

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/opinion/trump-supporters-economy-

racism.html; see also PRRI/The Atlantic Report, supra note 237. See generally DISCRIMINATION IN

AMERICA REPORT, supra note 237 (surveying Americans on discrimination in America).
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anxieties about the ascent of minority groups on the other, miss the
point: These are not two different factors but two sides of the
same coin. 251

The recent research on the election of Donald Trump reveals that fear of
cultural eclipse, belief that white Americans are being discriminated
against, and belief that immigrants are threatening American job security
undergird white and white working-class support for Donald Trump.

V.

CONCLUSION

In the mid-1970s, the anti-abortion movement was transformed from
the protection of fetal life to the protection of a way oflife. The pro-family
movement brought a critical shift that explicitly linked opposition to
abortion with the protection of motherhood, the patriarchal family, and
the protection of American culture and values. Critically, what began as a
movement to protect fetal life was transformed into a larger call for a
return to traditional family structures and traditional American values.
White women had a specific role to play in mobilizing against abortion:
In a narrative familiar to nationalist movements, white motherhood was
glorified and called upon to defend the nation's Christian heritage and
culture against threats from outsiders. The family-values movement
identified motherhood and the patriarchal family as the bulwark in the
defense of American culture and values. As motherhood was glorified in
the battle over the soul of the nation, abortion was cast as harming mothers
and devaluing motherhood. This messaging helps explain why white
women transformed the face of the family-values movement in the 1970s
and later answered the call of Donald Trump's campaign. In the
nationalistic narrative of the pro-family movement, white women's anger
is elevated to righteousness and their maternal role is rebranded as a
mission to save the nation at the level of the family from the threat of
immigration and cultural eclipse.
To understand white women's support for Donald Trump, it is
necessary to investigate the origins of the family-values narrative upon
which he draws so heavily. Nationalist movements often call upon a
nation's mothers to defend the nation's culture and values because
motherhood and the family are identified as the place where a nation's
values and culture are inculcated in its citizenry. It elevates anti-feminist
opposition to abortion rights beyond the realm of political and moral
beliefs to a struggle over cultural identity and way of life. This has
important implications for understanding the rise of conservative pro-

251.

Cherlin,supra note 250.
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family, anti-abortion movements in times of economic recession and
perceived cultural displacement, especially among white middle- and
working-class women in the United States. The pro-family movement that
intertwined the defense of motherhood, traditional family, and nation
continues to animate Trump's nationalistic rhetoric and opposition to
abortion. Trump's anti-immigrant, pro-American narrative of "Make
America Great Again," played upon the same set of white working- and
middle-class American's fears of being culturally eclipsed by outsiders,
relief from economic decline, and drew upon white backlash against
perceived cultural threats. Trump's speeches draw explicit connection
between women's interest in protecting home and family and the nation's
need to protect its borders. If "Build the Wall" is the rallying cry for
protecting the nation's borders, opposition to abortion is its gendered
corollary to defend its mothers, families, and heritage.
More broadly, the relationship between nationalism and the defense
of nation, families, and motherhood reveals that abortion is not a right
252
with a static meaning, but rather it's meaning is socially constructed.
As such, the abortion right assumes significant symbolic power that
changes over time and is driven by a myriad of social and historical
relationships and influences. Distilling the right to a single meaningsuch as "choice" or "privacy"-unmoored from the historical and social
forces that shape and undergird it, makes it vulnerable to erosion and
limits the vision for how to protect the right. For example, recently highprofile members of the Democratic Party have suggested removing the
3
abortion right from the Democratic Party platform 2 5 in an effort to woo
more socially-conservative voters. Understanding the relationship

252. The social construction of abortion has been the subject of important feminist scholarship,
see, e.g., PETCHESKY, supra note 37, at 241, 330-35 ("Abortion derives its meanings, not from any
theological text or abstract moral code, but from the particular historical conditions surrounding it.").
Petchesky refers to the social and contextual conditions that shape abortion politics as "moral praxis."
Id. at 33 1. See generally Reva Siegel, Reasoningfrom the Body: A HistoricalPerspectiveon Abortion

Regulation and Questions ofEqual Protection,44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992) (providing a history of
regulations restricting abortion and how the perception of abortion has changed since the nineteenth
century).

253. For example, in an interview with the Washington Post, then-House Minority Leader Nancy
Pelosi said that abortion rights are "fading as an issue." Amber Phillips, Nancy Pelosi Says Abortion
Is 'Fading'asan Issuefor Democrats. TheOppositeIs Truefor Conservatives, WASH. POST: THE

Fix (May 3, 2017,10:31 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/05/03/nancypelosi-says-abortion-is-fading-as-an-issue-for-democrats-the-opposite-is-true-for-conservatives.
Senator Bemie Sanders campaigned for an anti-choice mayoral candidate in Nebraska, arguing that
support for candidates should not "exclude people who disagree with us on one issue." Scott Detrow,
Bernie Sanders Defends Campaigningfor Anti-Abortion Rights Democrat, NPR (Apr. 20, 2017),
http://www.npr.org/2017/04/20/524962482/sanders-defends-campaigning-for-anti-abortion-rightsdemocrat.
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between economic decline, nationalism, and anti-abortion legislation
reveals that this impulse is misguided. The connection between abortion
and nationalism at times of economic flux and instability in gender roles
would suggest that Democrats need to offer meaningful solutions to the
economic and social stagnation facing the nation's poor and middle
class-problems that drive nationalism and anti-immigrant rhetoricrather than through the expediency of scapegoating the abortion right to
gain votes. Indeed, the connection between nationalism, motherhood,
family, and abortion suggests that rather than focusing solely on
legislative and court-won victories to protect the abortion right, policy
solutions should seek meaningful economic and social justice reform
efforts aimed at relieving the economic and social decline that drives
nationalist movements. In short, the battle for securing abortion rights is
not solely a battle over the narrative of what abortion means. Rather,
securing reproductive rights must be accomplished through securing
economic justice and not simply legislative and court-won victories to
secure abortion access.
It is a critical time to consider how the narrative of nationalism helps
drive anti-abortion legislation as these laws are gaining traction and
accelerating at the state level during the Trump administration.2 54
Uncovering abortion's significant symbolic meaning in the narrative of
protecting nation, family, and motherhood suggests that an important
means of protecting the right must include addressing the social and
economic conditions that give rise to nationalist movements, such as
economic marginalization, wage stagnation in the working and middle
class, rising income inequality, and anxiety over declining social and
educational opportunities. Critically, these are issues that align with the
interests of mothers in securing opportunity for their children.
Understanding how anti-abortion messaging has been tailored to reach the
nation's mothers through a message of nationalism and protecting the
American way of life may offer the opportunity to realign the message to
reach those very mothers who subscribe to it.

254. The recent wave of abortion restrictions in the first half of 2019 has included trigger
legislation that would go into effect if Roe v. Wade is overturned, bans on procedures at gestational
points as early as six weeks of pregnancy, bans on common abortion procedures, and bans on
abortions procured for specific characteristics such as race, sex, or disability of the fetus. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Nash et al., Radical Attempts to Ban Abortion Dominate State Policy Trends in the First
Quarterof2019, GUTTMACHERINST. (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.orgarticle/2019/04/rad
ical-attempts-ban-abortion-dominate-state-policy-trends-first-quarter-2019.
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